United Nations S/2011/548

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 29 August 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey the report on the international security presence in Kosovo, covering the period from 1 April to 30 June 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

Report to the United Nations on the operations of the Kosovo Force

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) reporting requirement under United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). The report covers the period from 1 April to 30 June 2011.

2. As at 30 June 2011, the total number of KFOR troops in theatre stood at 5,951, including 1,115 troops from non-NATO countries.

Security situation and operations

3. The situation in Kosovo remained generally calm throughout the reporting period, during which KFOR continued operations to maintain a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement. Two multinational battle groups are now conducting highly mobile, intelligence-driven operations with flexible, strong reserves capable of deterring violence and responding to crisis situations in Kosovo, and with five joint regional detachments providing situational awareness. KFOR conducted operations as a third responder in northern Kosovo in support of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the Kosovo Police.

4. On 7 April 2011, the Chief of General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Miletić, visited KFOR Commander Major General Bühler to attend a regular high-level meeting of the Joint Implementation Commission. During the reporting period, another high-level meeting of the Joint Implementation Commission took place on 21 June 2011 in Kapaonik.

5. On 26 April 2011 and following a prior North Atlantic Council decision on the issue, KFOR released an order concerning the handover of guarding tasks at the Holy Archangel Monastery from KFOR troops to Kosovo Police. The transition phase for this handover commenced on 26 April 2011 and was successfully completed on 10 May 2011. That day, KFOR handed over full responsibility for the protection of the monastery to the Kosovo Police.

6. The joint KFOR/EULEX exercise "Balkan Hawk" took place at the end of June 2011. The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was also invited to participate in the exercise, employing its core capabilities, such as demining, clearance of hazardous material, search and rescue and firefighting.

7. From 24 to 29 May 2011, the German and Austrian troops of the Operational Reserve Force battalion conducted an operational rehearsal in the KFOR area of operations as part of their preparation prior to assuming their Operational Reserve Force battalion responsibility. The aim of this rehearsal was to familiarize battalion leaders with the environment and potential tasks prior to any possible deployment to the KFOR area of operations in 2011. Also, on 24 May 2011, KFOR conducted a joint field training exercise with EULEX at Gate 31.

8. On 18 June 2011, KFOR formalized the handover of 19 kilometres of border responsibility along the border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[1] to the Kosovo Border and Boundary Police.

New tasks of NATO

9. During the reporting period, the Kosovo Security Force considerably enhanced its main operational performance, always within its mandate. KSF now has approximately 2,200 active members, nearly 85 per cent of its authorized ceiling, with 8 per cent comprising ethnic minorities and 4.7 per cent of whom are females.

10. At the beginning of the reporting period, the recruitment campaign for the active KSF component concluded. A total of 4,580 applications were received, of which 224 were from female candidates and 148 were from ethnic minorities. On 7 June 2011, the final selection board was held, in order to select 250 new members. A total of 396 applicants were invited to attend the final selection process. The first 150 successful candidates started training on 14 June 2011, with the remaining successful applicants starting in October 2011.

11. The start of the demining season during the reporting period also marked the first year KSF is conducting explosive ordnance disposal emergency response operations in conjunction with humanitarian demining operations in Kosovo. There are approximately 110 known or suspected sites in Kosovo and the KSF Mine Action Centre is closely tracking these locations. On average only five locations are cleared per year.

Summary

12. The overall security situation in Kosovo remained stable during the reporting period. KFOR continues to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo.

[1] Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statements by the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30) and 10 March 2011 (S/PRST/2011/6) and Security Council resolutions 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009) and 1910 (2010), and as specified in paragraph 20 of resolution 1964 (2010), in which the Council requested me to report on all aspects of the resolution every four months. This report provides an update on major developments in Somalia since my report of 28 April 2011 (S/2011/277) until 15 August 2011 and assesses the political, security, human rights and humanitarian situation as well as progress made in implementing the United Nations strategy for Somalia. The report also covers the operational activities of the United Nations and the international community.

II. Main developments in Somalia

2. The reporting period was characterized by positive political and security developments. The political stalemate among the transitional federal institutions was broken by the signing of the Kampala Accord. The Transitional Federal Government's troops, with the support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), made significant military achievements, routing the Al-Shabaab insurgents from Mogadishu and finally taking control of the capital. The famine in five regions of southern Somalia and a food crisis elsewhere, owing to the prolonged drought, an increase in food prices and the continuing conflict have been of great concern in the past few months.

A. Political developments

3. The most significant political development in the past four months has been the unity of the transitional federal institutions. The rift between President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, had threatened to bring political progress towards ending the transition to a standstill. The Speaker maintained that elections for the Presidency, the Speaker and the Speaker's deputies should be held before the end of the transition on 20 August 2011, while the President, citing security concerns and the

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need to carry out key transitional tasks, stated that elections should be postponed for a year.

4. Following the Security Council's Presidential Statement of 11 May (S/PRST/2011/10), the President and the Speaker met several times in Mogadishu in an unsuccessful effort to resolve the impasse. The Council reiterated its call to the leadership of the transitional federal institutions to come to an agreement on the timing of elections, which they agreed to do, during its mission to the region on 25 May. The Council also met with representatives from "Puntland", "Somaliland" and "Galmudug", the Kenyan leadership, the United Nations country team and civil society organizations to find a way to break the deadlock over ending the transition.

5. The International Contact Group on Somalia, which met in Kampala on 2 and 3 June, urged the leadership to reach consensus and swiftly complete the critical transitional tasks, most notably the constitution-making process, through a credible and inclusive consultation process. At the end of the Group's meeting, my Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, worked closely with the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to bring the President and the Speaker together for nearly a week of intense negotiations. This resulted in the Kampala Accord, signed on 9 June, in which both sides agreed to defer the elections for 12 months from August 2011.

6. The Accord provided for the resignation of Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed within 30 days, the appointment and endorsement by Parliament of a new Prime Minister and Cabinet, and an undertaking by the Transitional Federal Government and the Transitional Federal Parliament to work together with the international community to establish a road map with benchmarks, timelines and compliance mechanisms for the implementation of priority tasks. It also provided for the Heads of State and Government of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community, with the participation of the United Nations and the African Union, to monitor compliance with the road map.

7. Inside Somalia, there was initially public anger against the agreement between the President and the Speaker that the Prime Minister, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, should step down, and demonstrations were held inside and outside the country. The Prime Minister, who was seen as having made progress on several fronts, resigned on 19 June. The former Planning Minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, was endorsed by Parliament on 28 June as the new Prime Minister with an overwhelming majority. On 11 July, 393 members of the Transitional Federal Parliament voted in favour of the Kampala Accord, with 36 against and 7 abstentions. On 20 July, the new Prime Minister appointed a new Cabinet of 18 ministers after widely consulting with communities and political stakeholders. The Cabinet was approved by the Parliament on 23 July and sworn in on 28 July.

8. The Accord was welcomed by the region and international community, including by the Security Council in its Presidential Statement of 24 June (S/PRST/2011/13). The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, at its seventeenth ordinary session held on 30 June and 1 July, welcomed the Accord and encouraged the speedy formation of a new Government and its subsequent endorsement by Parliament. It underlined that the expeditious implementation of the Accord would help consolidate the military gains made by the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM. The eighteenth extraordinary

session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of IGAD, held on 4 July, called for the full implementation of the Accord as part of a wider programme of reconciliation and outreach.

9. Following months of intense military operations by the Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by AMISOM troops, Al-Shabaab withdrew on 6 August from positions it had held in Mogadishu for nearly two years. Al-Shabaab's departure from Mogadishu presents the Transitional Federal Government with the opportunity to extend its area of control over the entire capital and enhance its legitimacy by delivering services to the residents.

10. With the advent of the end of the transitional period, Somalia has witnessed a proliferation of entities claiming to be regional administrations, some with claims over the same areas. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) has encouraged these emerging administrations to adopt a united approach and to cooperate with the transitional federal institutions. Some Member States have been exercising a dual-track approach to enhance working relations with the regional administrations, while continuing engagement in Mogadishu. The Transitional Federal Government has expressed concern that such a policy may lead to fragmentation of international support and a proliferation of regional entities. In a related development, the Ras Kamboni group, a former Hizbul Islam faction led by Ahmed Madobe, requested the support of UNPOS in reconciling it with the Transitional Federal Government. President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has welcomed this development and requested the support of UNPOS in developing a regional policy framework for engagement with the emerging subregional entities.

11. A meeting to resolve internal differences between factions of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a was organized under IGAD auspices in Addis Ababa on 14 May. Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a aims to establish a recognized national leadership that can constructively engage with the Transitional Federal Government to complete the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement of 15 March 2010. A much-anticipated conference convened by Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a in late July failed to resolve the issue of national leadership and was dismissed by some members as not being representative.

12. On 3 July, the "Puntland" Parliament nominated four members of the electoral commission and its President appointed five in a process of democratization of the political system. The "Puntland" Constitution envisages a move from a clan-based administration to a political system through an independent electoral commission responsible for preparing electoral legislation, organizing a referendum on the Constitution, establishing political parties and holding municipal elections.

13. After months of negotiations, initiated by the "Somaliland" President, a reconciliation conference was held from 23 to 26 June for the Sool region, between the Sool-Sanag-Cayn alliances and the Dhulbahante sub-clan. The conference resulted in an agreement covering prisoner release, illegal land-grabbing and digging of boreholes. Meanwhile, a survey organized by an officially appointed committee found support for an expansion in the number of political parties allowed to register.

14. A report by the Somali Public Finance Management Unit, covering the accounting years of 2009 and 2010, alleged public financial mismanagement, concealment of revenues and misappropriation of public and donor funds by Somali

Government entities. The World Bank is undertaking further research with partners to determine the extent to which the allegations can be independently verified.

B. Security situation

15. In Mogadishu, the Transitional Federal Government forces, with the support of AMISOM, made gains against Al-Shabaab in May and had significant influence over 8 of Mogadishu's 16 districts by early June. As at 15 August, this influence had expanded to 90 per cent of the capital.

16. Al-Shabaab was weakened by defeats in Mogadishu and rumours that some of its leaders had colluded in the killing of Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, a senior commander and Al-Qaida representative, on 8 June. Continuing recruitment, taxation and the lifting of a ban against aid agencies also suggested its capabilities were reduced by fighting on several fronts.

17. Al-Shabaab's withdrawal from Mogadishu has compelled AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government troops to become overextended. The Transitional Federal Government has imposed martial law on the newly vacated areas and created a "Mogadishu Security Plan", which calls for the Somali Police Force to occupy the vacated areas.

18. During the reporting period, groups loosely allied with the Transitional Federal Government fought Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia, specifically in the Gedo and Juba areas. Al-Shabaab maintained a significant presence in these regions and is believed to be responsible for improvised explosive device attacks in Mandera, Kenya, in early June and late July. Progress by those opposing Al-Shabaab was hindered by clan and political disputes and no advances were made into Bay and Bakool. Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a and other militias opposing Al-Shabaab made limited gains against Al-Shabaab in Galguduud and Hiraan.

19. Al-Shabaab sympathizer Sheikh Atom and his militia attacked "Puntland" forces near Galgala, Bari Province, in mid-May and the area remained insecure despite reported negotiations. "Puntland's" general security apparatus was repeatedly challenged by multiple killings and attacks over clan, religious and ideological issues. Las Anod experienced killings and violent attacks owing to the disagreement between "Somaliland", "Puntland" and Sool-Sanag-Cayn alliances over territory. "Somaliland" forces and Sool-Sanag-Cayn militia fought in May, and "Puntland" and "Somaliland" clashed in August. Proposed oil drilling north of Las Anod by a commercial partner of "Puntland" added to existing tensions.

C. Piracy

20. Since my last report of 28 April (S/2011/277), there has been a reduction in hostages and ships held: from 550 hostages down to 448 and from 26 ships held down to 21, according to the International Maritime Organization. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has become an entrenched criminal enterprise with a growing geographical area of operations, larger scale attacks, increased levels of violence and higher ransoms. I intend to present a full update on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia in my October report, pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 1950 (2010).

D. Humanitarian situation

21. The humanitarian situation is rapidly worsening as famine spreads to southern central Somalia. On 20 July, the United Nations declared a famine in southern Bakool and Shabelle Hoose and warned that urgent action needed to be taken to prevent famine from spreading further. On 3 August, famine was also declared in parts of Shabelle Dhexe, the Afgooye corridor and internally displaced person areas in Mogadishu. The malnutrition rates in these areas are the highest in the world, with peaks of 50 per cent. Nearly half of the Somali population, 3.7 million, is now in crisis and an estimated 2.8 million of those people reside in the south, which is among the hardest hit areas in the country.

22. There are currently 640,000 acutely malnourished children in southern Somalia, which represents 82 per cent of all acutely malnourished children in the country. In some areas of the south, one in three children is acutely malnourished. Further deterioration is considered likely, given the under-5 mortality rates in combination with an expectation of a continued increase in local cereal prices, and a below-average rainy season harvest.

23. The drought crisis has generated displacement on a large scale within Somalia as well as refugee outflows into Kenya and Ethiopia. To date, the overall number of internally displaced persons in Somalia is estimated at 1.5 million people. Some 100,000 people have arrived in the past two months, fleeing drought and famine, in addition to the 370,000 people who were already displaced to the capital. An estimated 410,000 internally displaced persons are located in the 15-km road stretch of the Afgooye corridor outside Mogadishu.

24. Since 1 August, an estimated 1,500 Somali refugees have crossed the border into Kenya on a daily basis. In Ethiopia, the average number of refugees arriving on a daily basis stands at 270 persons. Between 1 May and 8 August, Kenya registered 64,440 Somali refugees. Since 16 April, 60,446 Somali refugees have been registered in Ethiopia.

25. A massive multisectoral response is critical to prevent additional deaths and total livelihood and social collapse. Health interventions are as important as the provision of food aid and therapeutic feeding, particularly as the risk of epidemic disease, owing to a lack of access to potable water, is likely to increase with the start of the October rains. In early August, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 18 out of 30 samples tested positive for cholera among displaced persons in Mogadishu. Several cases of acute watery diarrhoea, mainly among displaced persons, have been reported in Kismaayo, with at least 40 cases and 4 deaths.

26. On 6 and 21 July, Al-Shabaab announced that humanitarian interventions in areas under its control would be allowed, albeit with conditions. The statement was later retracted and aid agencies are still unable to reach an estimated 2.2 million Somalis. The humanitarian community is in continued dialogue with local authorities and clan leaders in an effort to secure access and respond to the needs of the most vulnerable people.

27. The deforestation and land degradation in southern areas of Somalia have increased exposure and vulnerability to the effects of natural hazards and climate change, such as drought and floods. Much of the deforestation can be attributed to

the charcoal trade as the land where the acacia forests have been cut down for charcoal, such as between the Juba and Shabelle rivers, often becomes unsuitable for grazing, leading to increased conflict over land and water and the displacement of the local population.

E. Human rights and protection of civilians

28. The protection of civilians remains a major concern. Although not precisely known, the number of civilian casualties is believed to be high. The use of explosives in populated urban areas and suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab accounted for a significant number of civilian casualties.

29. Non-State armed actors continue to perpetrate serious human rights violations, including summary executions of civilians associated with parties to the conflict. Unlawful arrest and detention and acts amounting to torture and other inhumane, cruel and degrading practices, such as flogging, amputations and stoning, also took place during the reporting period.

30. On 3 May 2011, the Transitional Federal Government presented its first universal periodic review report for consideration by the Human Rights Council. The last time Somalia submitted a report to an international treaty body was in 1984. International support for this engagement was reflected in the high number of presentations by Member States. In June, the "Somaliland" Parliament formally endorsed the seven members of the Human Rights Commission and a five-year Justice Strategy was launched. "Puntland" is in the process of appointing the Human Rights Defender provided for in the Constitution. The United Nations system is closely involved in and supporting these processes.

31. In July, the independent expert of the Human Rights Council on the situation of human rights in Somalia conducted his seventh mission to Kenya and Somalia, including for the first time to Mogadishu. During the visit, he noted that drastically increasing food prices and continuing conflict and insecurity had caused a huge displacement of the population.

32. The ongoing conflict has increased the risk of sexual violence for women and children. There are reports of Al-Shabaab recruiting girls for forced marriage to fighters, and allegations of rape by militias allied to the Government in southern central Somalia. Although the United Nations has not been able to confirm widespread cases of sexual violence during flight among newly arrived refugees in Dadaab, Kenya, it is acknowledged that there are high risk areas on the outskirts of the camps and en route to Kenya where women and children may be more exposed to sexual violence by "bandits" or "men with guns".

F. Child protection

33. In May, June and July, 659 grave violations against children involving primarily child recruitment and killing and maiming of children in Mogadishu were reported in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. Child recruitment for use in hostilities remained the most serious violations in conflict-affected regions. Over 180 cases of children recruited by Al-Shabaab in Shabelle Hoose and

systematic recruitment in Bay and Bakool were documented during the reporting period. Schools are increasingly targeted for recruitment.

34. Some children recruited by Al-Shabaab have escaped and reported to the Transitional Federal Government for assistance and protection. The Government recently moved an unconfirmed number to a former military training camp in Mogadishu. Child protection agencies are willing to assist these children under a civilian-led process.

35. Despite commitment by the Transitional Federal Government to prevent child recruitment in its ranks and allied militias, it remains a challenge, especially in the absence of strict age screening procedures.

36. Non-governmental organizations continue to be the main providers of child protection services in "Somaliland" and "Puntland", with the role of the administrations limited to some policy development, coordination and standards.

G. Women, peace and security

37. A joint mission by the Department of Political Affairs and UN-Women visited UNPOS from 29 May to 3 June to support the inclusion of women in UNPOS-led mediation and reconciliation processes. Three major challenges emerged: the absence of women in formal peacebuilding; the need for a shared women's agenda for peace in Somalia; and the commitment of the transitional federal institutions to ensure fair representation of women in formal mediation and political processes.

38. As a follow-up to their meeting with the joint mission, more than 20 Somali grass-roots groups sent a statement to the International Contact Group meeting held in June. The statement offered recommendations for the resolution of the political deadlock and on their engagement in future consultative meetings. In another joint initiative, a training workshop from 13 to 15 July in Nairobi aimed at building Somali women's capacities for peace and mediation gathered 32 women and 1 man representing 11 major networks from around the country.

39. A letter of agreement was signed with the Ministry of Women's Development and Family Affairs in "Puntland" for the development of a decree on the abolition of female genital mutilation.

III. Activities of the United Nations

A. The United Nations presence and coordinated approach in Somalia

40. The establishment of the "light footprint" in Mogadishu continues to progress with UNPOS, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs joining the United Nations Mine Action Service, the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security in maintaining a permanent presence of international staff, which averages 30 staff. The authorized international staff ceiling remains 52. The permanent accommodation and office facility being

constructed by UNSOA should be completed in December 2011 for about 30 additional UNPOS and UNSOA staff.

41. Meanwhile, the common compound managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) compound in Mogadishu and the WFP facility at the seaport continue to serve as accommodation and office space for United Nations national staff members. The average number of national staff members engaged in critical programme activities in Mogadishu is about 40.

42. United Nations operations involving the movement of international staff members outside the airport remain at very high risk, and are dependent on AMISOM. In the reporting period, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security facilitated 78 such missions to one or more of the 42 security-cleared locations throughout Mogadishu.

43. During the reporting period, UNPOS made progress in the deployment of its staff into Somalia. Twelve of 41 envisaged international and national staff have now deployed to Mogadishu, Hargeysa in "Somaliland" and Garoowe in "Puntland". Given the new situation in the capital, UNPOS is actively planning for an expanded United Nations presence inside Somalia, rather than the planned "light footprint".

44. The Senior Policy Group in Nairobi continues to bring together the senior management of UNPOS, UNSOA and the United Nations country team. UNPOS and the United Nations country team have carried out joint fund-raising and are working together to ensure complementary responses to the famine and humanitarian crisis. The Group worked to resolve three of the seven challenges identified in the integrated strategic framework, including the preparation of a road map for the transition, developing a "Mogadishu recovery and stabilization strategy" and defining parameters for the increasing numbers of "emerging administrations".

45. In July, the Senior Policy Group agreed to extend the integrated strategic framework until December 2012. UNPOS has also pursued thematic integration with selected United Nations agencies. This includes the Joint Constitution Unit with UNDP, the merger of the Security Unit with UNSOA, and co-location of the Public Information and Strategic Communication and Information Support Units of UNPOS and UNSOA.

B. Strengthening the political process

46. In June and July, UNPOS facilitated the work of a preparatory committee for the consultative meeting on ending the transition comprising the Transitional Federal Government, Transitional Federal Parliament, "Puntland" and "Galmudug". My Special Representative also facilitated the drafting of a road map with input from the transitional federal institutions and regional administrations. The consultative meeting, which is expected to approve the road map and involve the participation of national and regional authorities and a broad range of stakeholders from civil society in Somalia, is planned to be held from 4 to 6 September in Mogadishu.

47. The road map outlines the priority transition tasks that the transitional federal institutions should accomplish in the one-year extended period. It includes a compliance mechanism comprising a joint international coordination committee and

a regional political initiative consisting of the Heads of State and Government of IGAD and the East African Community.

48. My Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited the region on 20 and 21 July, during which he met the United Nations country team, UNPOS, AMISOM, diplomats based in Nairobi and, in Mogadishu, the leadership of the transitional federal institutions to discuss the political and security situation and the humanitarian crisis.

49. In line with the joint regional strategy signed on 23 February 2011, my Special Representative works closely with IGAD and AMISOM and co-chairs a monthly principals' working group on Somalia. The standing working relationship of UNPOS, IGAD and AMISOM, together with the cooperation of the East African Community, will form part of the support structure for the regional political initiative, proposed by President Museveni and endorsed by IGAD, aimed at overseeing the implementation of the Kampala Accord.

50. My Special Representative convened, together with Finn Church Aid and the African Council of Religious Leaders, the third meeting of Somali religious leaders and traditional elders in Entebbe, Uganda, from 24 to 26 June. The meeting proposed the establishment, in southern central Somalia, of a permanent structure (Guurti) of traditional elders and clan leaders (25 per cent of whom would be women) to assist the transitional federal institutions in their outreach and reconciliation efforts.

51. Under the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy, UNODC and UNDP are developing a multi-year joint programme on accountability, transparency and integrity that will help Somali institutions comply with international instruments and standards and improve their accountability.

52. The Independent Federal Constitution Commission is undertaking a consultative process on the draft constitution that has engaged the transitional federal institutions, "Puntland", "Galmudug", civil society and local communities. United Nations teams mapped out how the constitution-making process could move forward in the next year and a public consultation strategy has been developed.

C. Targeted sanctions

53. The Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea met on 23 May, on 15, 22 and 27 July as well as on 9 August. During the 23 May meeting, the Committee was briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, as proposed by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in its conclusions on Somalia (S/AC.51/2011/2).

54. On 15 July, the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea briefed the Committee on the Group's final report (S/2011/433). He highlighted the Group's recommendations that the Transitional Federal Government should officially ban all trade by large merchant vessels with Al-Shabaab controlled ports. It was further recommended that any member of the transitional federal institutions whose actions threaten the political process or otherwise detract from the Transitional Federal Government's capacity to fulfil its mandate, should be considered subject to targeted measures.

55. On 28 July, the Committee added two names to the list of individuals and entities subject to the travel ban, assets freeze and targeted arms embargo imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008). On 29 July, the Council adopted resolution 2002 (2011), by which it extended and expanded the mandate of the Monitoring Group. The Council added the recruitment and use of children as well as the targeting of civilians, including children and women, to the designation criteria for targeted measures. It also stipulated that individuals and entities engaged in non-local commerce using Al-Shabaab controlled ports, which constitutes financial support for a designated entity, may be subject to targeted sanctions.

D. Progress towards full deployment and strengthening of the African Union Mission in Somalia

56. The force strength of AMISOM has remained at approximately 9,300 since the deployment of 1,000 Burundian troops in March. The African Union has received firm offers of additional troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Uganda to enable AMISOM to reach its authorized force strength of 12,000 in line with Security Council resolution 1964 (2010).

57. UNSOA continues to provide logistical support to AMISOM comprising essential supplies and equipment, engineering and construction, medical equipment, supplies and services, aviation and transportation, strategic telecommunications capability, public information support and training. The United Nations Office to the African Union continued to assist the African Union Commission in finalizing the force generation and participated in three predeployment inspections and visits.

58. Resource gaps continue to adversely affect the effectiveness of AMISOM. Essential self-sustainment requirements that go beyond the logistical support package have fallen short of fulfilling its requirements. AMISOM lacks the most basic and essential supplies and services, such as catering, communications and information technology, cleaning and sanitary supplies, and welfare, which would be integral to the support provided or reimbursed to a troop contributor in a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Reimbursement to troop contributors for contingent-owned equipment is now five months in arrears owing to insufficient resources in the trust fund.

59. The African Union organized a technical workshop on 17 and 18 August in Addis Ababa aimed at identifying ways of enhancing support for AMISOM commensurate with the challenges in Somalia. Participants recommended: (a) accelerating the deployment of the additional troops to enable AMISOM to quickly reach the strength of 12,000 troops; (b) enhancement of the support package provided by the United Nations; (c) deployment of AMISOM formed police units to bolster the maintenance of law and order in the capital; (d) creation, as part of AMISOM and under its command, of a guard force of adequate size, to facilitate deployment of civilian staff and provide protection for the African Union and United Nations in Mogadishu; and (e) the elaboration of a revised concept of operations.

60. A joint assessment by AMISOM, UNPOS, UNSOA and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security had earlier reached a similar conclusion on the need for a dedicated capacity within AMISOM to provide security for United

Nations personnel and visiting international partners. United Nations operations are interrupted when all AMISOM capacities are required to carry out its principal mandated tasks and operational priorities.

61. The permanent AMISOM VIP conference rooms and the movement control facilities located adjacent to Mogadishu airport were completed. In Mogadishu, 150 other engineering projects are under way in support of AMISOM, most of which are expected to be completed by the end of 2011. Temporary offices and living accommodation compliant with minimum operating security standards were made available to AMISOM civilian staff, as well as to UNPOS, UNSOA and other United Nations agencies, to enable them to deploy essential staff to Mogadishu. Work on the coastal road linking the airport to the seaport and the level II hospital is progressing well, and water production and distribution facilities were enhanced at the major AMISOM camps.

62. UNSOA again intensified its medical support to AMISOM during the recent military operations, including 69 medical evacuation, transfer and repatriation flights from Mogadishu involving a total of 501 AMISOM personnel from 16 April to 15 August 2011.

63. Further to my last report, AMISOM has started implementing parts of its new indirect fire policy, developed with UNSOA support, for which more donor support is required. In July, AMISOM organized a meeting in Kigali on enhancing respect for international humanitarian law.

64. AMISOM explosive ordnance disposal teams continued clearance and destroyed 972 items of unexploded ordnance in Mogadishu, bringing the total number of items destroyed since 2009 to 6,761. The support of the United Nations Mine Action Service enables AMISOM to facilitate safe access for civilian, humanitarian and military actors, thereby contributing to stabilization and recovery.

65. UNSOA continues to provide strategic communication and information support to AMISOM. Numerous high-profile international and regional media visits were facilitated, prompting increased news coverage. The United Nations-funded Radio Bar-kulan is an essential tool in supporting peace and remains popular, with the Somali Football Federation recently recognizing it as "radio of the year". Radio Bar-kulan is working to expand its broadcasts beyond Mogadishu, including in recently taken areas along the Somalia-Kenya border.

66. UNSOA continues to prioritize training of AMISOM personnel to improve capacity in line with Security Council resolution 1863 (2009). So far, more than 1,900 personnel have been trained in programmes relevant to peacekeeping.

E. Strengthening of the Somali security institutions and development of a national security strategy

Policy and coordination

67. On 23 June, the eighth Joint Security Committee meeting was held in Entebbe, Uganda. UNPOS presented military and police action plans, aiming at tracking progress in key outstanding tasks. The Committee also discussed the findings and recommendations of the security sector assessment report prepared following the 2011 Somali-led scoping mission and the 2010 Somalia security sector assessment

report. The Committee urged the Transitional Federal Government to immediately revise the 2009 National Security and Stabilization Plan.

68. UNPOS has developed a security sector development strategy for 2011 to 2013 aimed at coordinating international assistance within the framework of the Joint Security Committee and its technical working groups; providing advisory support to the Transitional Federal Government; building Somali institutions through partnerships with AMISOM, IGAD and the United Nations country team; advocating and stepping up resource mobilization efforts; and tracking and monitoring outcomes and impact of security sector development interventions in Somalia.

Military

69. The National Security Force in Mogadishu numbers 10,298 troops. With funds from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Union and the United States of America, the biometric identification system initiated in January should cover the entire National Security Force in Mogadishu by October. Italy and the United States of America provided funding in February to resolve the outstanding backlog of stipend payments. The Army Chief of Staff has called for stipends and logistical support for the allied forces in southern central Somalia.

70. The first batch of trained soldiers from the European Union training mission in Uganda was reintegrated into the National Security Force and is operating on the frontlines in Mogadishu. The second batch is expected by September. On 28 July, the European Union extended the mandate of the training mission for a year. Training will now focus on developing the command and control structures, specialized capabilities and self-training capacities of the National Security Force, with a view to transferring European Union training expertise to local actors.

71. From April to May, UNPOS facilitated a training needs assessment exercise for the National Security Force, conducted by a sub-committee of the Military Technical Working Group of the Joint Security Committee.

Police

72. During the reporting period, UNPOS, UNDP and AMISOM worked together to pay 3,077 Somali Police Force officers their outstanding stipends from January to May 2010, using the funds provided by Japan. Although funding has been secured from March until September, there are still funding gaps for stipend arrears from June 2010 to February 2011. Also through funding from Japan, UNPOS provided 1,800 ballistic helmets, 1,068 VHF handsets and other equipment to the Somali Police Force, and initiated the rehabilitation project of eight police stations in Mogadishu.

73. UNPOS and its partners continue to train the Somali Police Force. The AMISOM police contingent, based in Mogadishu, organized three-week, 25-person, traffic and community policing induction courses for the Somali Police Force at the Aljazeera military training camp in Mogadishu.

74. In "Puntland", the Peacebuilding Fund is funding a UNDP project through its Immediate Response Facility to help build professional and accountable police forces, and develop a database for the police personnel. During the reporting period,

an additional 300 police officers, including 29 women, completed the three-week capacity assessment training course at the Armo Police Academy, bringing the number of trained officers to 900, including 80 women.

Mine action

75. Transitional Federal Government police continued to survey and clear explosive remnants of war and stockpiles in Mogadishu. Explosive detection dog handlers trained by the United Nations Mine Action Service continued search tasks to secure entry points at Aden Adde International Airport.

Justice and corrections

76. In Mogadishu, Garoowe and Hargeysa, 104 judges and prosecutors are undergoing a nine-month judicial training programme funded by UNDP and delivered by local law faculties.

77. An assessment by the United Nations in Nairobi and Mogadishu in April focused on drawing up an initial plan for support to prisons in Mogadishu. The assessment concluded that the Mogadishu central prison requires significant improvement to bring it up to the minimum standards required.

78. In "Somaliland", a national justice conference from 14 to 16 June approved a five-year strategy for the development of the judicial sector. UNDP completed the construction of court buildings in Hargeysa and Booroma and a regional prosecutor's office in Burao and provided legal materials and equipment. Somali legal aid providers, supported by UNDP, have dealt with approximately 2,500 cases in 2011. Hargeysa prison, which opened in March, was equipped by UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Serving officers received training, standing and operational orders were developed and prisoners received uniforms.

79. In "Puntland", the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime began the rehabilitation and expansion, by 50 per cent, of Boosaaso prison. The Office also received funding for a new prison in Garoowe.

80. UNDP has supported the launch of advanced training courses for the judiciary and the development of the High Judicial Councils in Somalia. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is cooperating with UNDP on elements of piracy trials, including law reform and capacity development of the prosecutor's offices.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

81. The Transitional Federal Government is currently providing shelter and feeding some 60 ex-combatants who are in cantonment, with limited logistical support from UNSOA. On 21 and 22 June, UNPOS, AMISOM and IGAD co-hosted a workshop on international shared lessons learned on handling ex-combatants in Entebbe, Uganda.

F. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Mogadishu

82. Efforts to coordinate the United Nations planning for recovery and stabilization in Mogadishu continued, despite the assassination of the Minister of the Interior in a terrorist attack and other changes in key interlocutors. A set of

priorities covering human security, basic services and employment was agreed in June, with a cross section of the Government including ministers, the Benadir administration and district commissioners. The United Nations is making efforts to reallocate funds to these activities but money from new sources is also required.

83. During the reporting period, the United Nations worked directly with the Benadir administration in Hodan, Wardighleey and Boondheere districts which were recently taken by the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM and district commissioners across Mogadishu committed to provide a set of priorities by the end of August. Areas have been cleared of waste, market places have been improved and street lighting provided, utilizing funds from the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM.

84. A conference involving district safety committees was held in Mogadishu on 12 July to launch the programme for youth at risk, which is jointly run by UNDP, UNICEF and the International Labour Organization. The meeting was part of the armed violence reduction project, which aims to disengage 500 youth from combat and conflict.

85. In June Transitional Federal Government police explosive ordinance teams deployed to Hodan and Hawl Wadaag for the survey and clearance of explosive remnants of war and stockpiles in order to reduce the explosive threat, facilitate the safe return of displaced populations and enable recovery and reconstruction projects.

G. Humanitarian and recovery and development activities

Humanitarian activities

86. Humanitarian agencies are scaling up their response to the critical humanitarian situation in southern areas, where the crisis is most acute. Integrated strategies have been developed to address the most urgent needs of the population and prevent more people from falling into crisis. Livelihood support actions, including the distribution of seeds and tools, are being undertaken to allow farmers to prepare for the coming Deyr rains (October-December).

87. The United Nations declaration of a famine required a revision of the Somalia Consolidated Appeal, with the request now standing at $1.06 billion, up from $561 million. To date, 47 per cent has been funded, leaving approximately $560 million outstanding for the remainder of the year. In view of the acute needs, in July, the Central Emergency Response Fund and the emergency reserve of the Somalia Common Humanitarian Fund released $28 million and $4.7 million, respectively, to enhance and expand humanitarian activities in drought-stricken areas in Somalia.

88. During the reporting period, 1.16 million people received food aid. The current crisis has required the humanitarian community to scale up its food aid; for example, WFP airlifted approximately 60 metric tons of food to Somalia from 1 to 15 August and some 92,800 hot meals are being cooked each day, which is an increase from 85,000 per day. Additionally, food vouchers and cash relief have benefited over 47,000 people in Mogadishu. The United Nations assisted almost 400,000 children with vaccinations during the national immunization days. Approximately 7,700 people were treated for acute watery diarrhoea and cholera.

89. In the worst affected areas, during the past two months, over 23,300 severely malnourished children in central and south Somalia were treated through the provision of ready-to-use therapeutic foods. In July, an estimated 107,000 children received targeted supplementary feeding support. In the same region, over 140,000 people received emergency assistance packages. Water and sanitation interventions benefited almost 500,000 Somalis. Continued support for drinking water systems, including in Mogadishu and the Afgooye corridor, is providing safe drinking water to more than 1.9 million people. Thirteen hospitals across southern Somalia received enough emergency health kits to assist a catchment area of 130,000 people for three months.

90. United Nations interventions also benefited some 85,000 pupils throughout the country, while over 24,500 farmers and pastoralists received agriculture and livelihood interventions to prepare for the coming Deyr rains (October to December). Over 80,000 internally displaced persons received non-food items, also in the Mogadishu and Afgooye areas.

91. United Nations agencies in Mogadishu have been engaging with the Transitional Federal Government and municipal authorities to address the needs of the thousands of recently arrived internally displaced persons fleeing drought and conflict in the south of Somalia. Weekly joint coordination meetings have been organized between the ministerial-level drought committee and United Nations agencies and other humanitarian organizations. In response to the cholera outbreak, WHO has sent medical supplies to treat up to 20 severely affected adults or 40 children and over 200 moderate cases. As a follow-up to the ratification of the Kampala Convention by the Transitional Federal Parliament, UNHCR met with members of relevant parliamentary subcommittees in Mogadishu and agreed on a series of awareness-raising workshops and other initiatives for parliamentarians, civil society, media and community-based organizations aimed at facilitating the adoption of a national law on internally displaced persons.

92. Humanitarian mine action teams continued to provide awareness messages and conduct surveys to identify explosive remnants of war for destruction in the Hodan, Mediina and Dharkenley districts.

93. The first meeting of the monitoring and evaluation board of the four internally displaced person projects supported by the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund was held on 15 June in Garoowe. The meeting was co-chaired by the "Puntland" Minister of Planning and International Cooperation and UNHCR. The projects aim to reduce tensions between internally displaced persons and host communities in "Puntland" through the promotion of peaceful coexistence, the development of social infrastructure and shelter, and capacity-building.

94. The Humanitarian Coordinator, the Executive Director of WFP, representatives of key humanitarian agencies and donor Governments and regional leaders travelled to Mogadishu and Dollo, in Gedo, Somalia, in July to focus attention on the humanitarian situation and ensure a coordinated approach to the crisis. The Emergency Relief Coordinator met with the Transitional Federal Government and humanitarian partners in Mogadishu on 13 August.

Recovery and development activities

95. Efforts advanced to increase Somali people's access to social services under outcome one of the United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy. In southern central Somalia, the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery expanded into the Adado district in Galguduud. The "Somaliland" authorities imposed numerous restrictions on humanitarian and development work which hampered the activities of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations.

96. Under poverty reduction and livelihoods (Somali Assistance Strategy outcome two), 11,000 people received a six-month cash allowance for work projects in southern central Somalia, and 1,000 further households received employment and skills training in the Benadir region (Mogadishu). In "Puntland", 2,300 households received food for work projects, and fishing assessments and fishing training continued. In "Somaliland", the United Nations provided training on meat inspection in public slaughterhouses and private livestock associations, and supported the development of regulatory frameworks.

97. Under good governance and human security (Somali Assistance Strategy outcome three), five staff from the Central Bank of Somalia were trained in Uganda and 35 students from southern central Somalia and "Puntland" sat accountancy exams in "Somaliland". Following United Nations support, revenue collection in "Somaliland" increased by $8 million in the first half of 2011 compared with 2010. The "Somaliland" Civil Service Commission launched the civil service reform strategy.

IV. Resource mobilization

98. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland contributed an additional $2.5 million to the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM during the reporting period, allowing the contingent-owned equipment of the troop-contributing countries to be fully reimbursed for the period up to March 2011. Of the $40.8 million received by the trust fund to date, approximately 60 per cent was provided without caveats and used to support the military component of AMISOM. The funding for the civilian and police components of AMISOM has not been fully utilized due to the conditions in Mogadishu.

99. There were no further payments into the two trust funds managed by UNPOS. The peacebuilding trust fund for Somalia has a balance of $1.6 million and the trust fund in support of Somali security institutions has $18.7 million, most of which is committed to projects with the Somali Police Force. An agreement was signed with Finland on 10 August for a contribution of 460,000 euros for an outreach and reconciliation project under the peacebuilding trust fund.

100. Since its inception in January 2010, the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia has received contributions of $8.2 million and has disbursed $7 million. An international pledging event hosted by the United Arab Emirates in Dubai on 19 April produced new pledges of about $3.6 million to the trust fund, including the first pledges from the private sector.

V. Observations and recommendations

101. The international community is faced with a new catastrophe in Somalia. Famine conditions have expanded to five regions of southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, and threaten to expand throughout the south. In some areas, 13 of every 10,000 children under five die every day as a result of malnutrition and famine-related diseases. That is equivalent to 10 per cent of children under five dying every 11 weeks in these communities. Nearly half of the population, 3.7 million people, is in crisis. The international community must respond with greater urgency. Too many people are dying.

102. It is imperative that access is provided to aid agencies to assist those in need. I appeal to all parties to ensure the safety and protection of the civilian population. I also appeal to Member States to contribute generously to the Consolidated Appeal for Somalia. A multisectoral response is urgently needed to save lives and prevent a total collapse of livelihood and social systems. Short-term relief must be linked to building long-term sustainability and resilience through "climate-smart" agriculture, so as to end the cycle of recurring crises.

103. Beyond this immediate emergency, it is essential to seize the opportunities created by the Kampala Accord, the political road map, and the forced withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu. The hard-won gains on the security and political tracks must not be reversed. It is important to avoid a vacuum and assist the Transitional Federal Government in consolidating its authority over the capital and to engage in a genuine, inclusive and comprehensive national reconciliation process. The planned high-level meeting in Mogadishu from 4 to 6 September illustrates the growing confidence of Somalia's political actors about conditions inside the country. The international community must work closely with the transitional federal institutions and regional authorities to implement the road map and lay the foundations for a new political dispensation.

104. The failure of the Transitional Federal Government to support the population will undermine its legitimacy and will have implications for the political process. It is crucial that the international community supports the Transitional Federal Government so that it can exercise its responsibilities to protect civilians and play a coordinating role in delivering aid. Somali leaders need to implement change in all areas. The United Nations and the international community are committed to support them. But it is their responsibility to show leadership and deliver for the sake of their people. AMISOM has made many sacrifices and they should not be in vain. I also urge the Transitional Federal Government to eliminate any suspected financial corruption or mishandling of donor assistance.

105. The continued presence of AMISOM remains essential, especially in light of the new realities and challenges on the ground. The further deployment of AMISOM, up to its authorized strength of 12,000 troops, is urgently needed to fill the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu. Key enablers and force multipliers are also required to ensure the effectiveness of AMISOM operations in Mogadishu. At the same time, without international support for equipping and outfitting additional troops, troop-contributing countries will continue to face difficulties in deploying in a timely

manner. I invite the Security Council to renew its authorization for the deployment of AMISOM, subject to the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

106. **I appeal to Member States to immediately provide support for the deployment of additional resources to AMISOM, including support for troop-contributing countries. Looking beyond the most urgent needs, Member States need to expand their support for AMISOM in a manner that enables it to operate within a predictable budget that is commensurate with its mandate. In addition, I reiterate the Security Council's call in resolution 1964 (2010) for Member States to contribute generously and promptly to the United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM without caveats, or to make direct bilateral donations.**

107. **Critical gaps remain in the United Nations support package for AMISOM, mainly for self-sustainment and reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment. Expanding the scope of the support package to predictably and sustainably fund this essential area would be consistent with the spirit of Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) and contribute significantly towards raising AMISOM to United Nations standards, while also markedly improving the living conditions and morale of AMISOM troops. I intend to propose a workable solution to the Security Council in this regard.**

108. **The support provided by the United Nations Mine Action Service to AMISOM is indispensable to mitigate the threat posed to troops and civilians by removing explosive remnants of war and other explosive devices. To sustain this support, I recommend that the explosive management support package provided by the United Nations Mine Action Service to AMISOM be included in the United Nations logistical support package.**

109. **The national police and security forces are essential to hold ground recovered from the insurgents. The Transitional Federal Government must, however, improve command and control over its military and ensure that its arms and equipment do not fall into the hands of armed opposition groups. I am grateful to Member States and regional organizations that have supported military and police training, and appeal to others to contribute to this effort. I welcome the decision of the European Union to extend the mandate of its training mission in Uganda.**

110. **I welcome the recent United Nations work on planning for recovery stabilization in Mogadishu. Recovery and stabilization activities are urgently needed in areas that come under the authority of the Transitional Federal Government in order to create conditions under which humanitarian assistance can be provided in Mogadishu. I urge donors to provide additional and flexible funds that enable rapid disbursements.**

111. **I remain deeply concerned over continuing grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, especially against women and children, and call on all parties to immediately cease these violations and ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. I urge the Prime Minister to continue his predecessor's efforts to end the recruitment and use of children by the Transitional Federal Government.**

112. **The increased presence of the United Nations in Somalia will enhance engagement with the authorities, especially in support of the implementation of the transitional tasks and the road map, and the humanitarian response. As the international community expands its footprint, strengthened security arrangements are essential, especially as Al-Shabaab's use of terrorist tactics and asymmetric warfare is likely to increase. Accordingly, I support the rapid deployment of the proposed guard force, as well as the overall strengthening of the rule of law in Mogadishu, as outlined in paragraphs 59 and 60 of the present report.**

113. **I appeal to all Somalis, including the diaspora, to support the peace process and resolve what differences remain through dialogue and negotiation. This is a time of great crisis, but also of rare opportunity to work towards a better future for all.**

114. **Finally, I pay tribute to the Governments of Burundi and Uganda for their continued sacrifice and commitment to the cause of peace in Somalia. I reiterate my condolences to the families of the victims, including the relatives of the Transitional Federal Government forces, its allies and AMISOM soldiers who have lost their lives. I also express my gratitude to my Special Representative for his dedication and commitment to advancing the cause of peace and national reconciliation in Somalia during what has been a particularly arduous period. I also pay tribute to the men and women serving in the United Nations and partner organizations who operate under difficult conditions.**

DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
Dikhil
Asayita
GULF OF ADEN
Boosaaso (Bender Cassim)
Bandarbeyla
Qardho
Garoowe
Laascaanood
Burco (Burao)
Hargeysa
Berbera
Caynabo (Erigavo)
Las Anod
Taleex
Buuhoodle
Dolo
Luuq
Belet Weyne
Jawhar (Giohar)
Muqdisho (Mogadishu)
Marka (Merca)
Baraawe
Kismaayo (Chisimaio)
Bur Gaabo
Afgooye
Baydhaba (Bardale)
Xuddur (Oddur)
Garbahaarrey
Doolo
Beled Hawo
Dinsoor
Saakow
Buurhakaba
Waajid
Jilib
Sakow
Bu'aale
Jamaame
Afmadow
Raas Kamboni
Lamu
Garsen
Kenya
Ethiopia
Somalia
AWDAL
WOQOOYI GALBEED
TOGDHEER
SOOL
SANAAG
BARI
NUGAAL
MUDUG
GALGUDUUD
BAKOOL
HIRAAN
GEDO
BAY
SHABELLE DHEXE
SHABELLE HOOSE
JUBA DHEXE
JUBA HOOSE
INDIAN OCEAN
SOMALIA
National capital
Regional capital
Town, village
Airport
International boundary
Regional boundary
Indeterminate boundary
Main road
Track
Railroad
0 50 100 150 200 km
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Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations A/65/938–S/2011/550

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 September 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 34
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 30 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the so-called "presidential elections" held in Abkhazia, Georgia (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34.

An identical letter has been sent to the President of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-48554 (E) 060911

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Annex to the identical letters dated 30 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the so-called "presidential elections" held in Abkhazia, Georgia

On 26 August 2011, the Russian occupation forces and their proxy regime in Sokhumi conducted another cynical act of pseudo-democratic policy, the so-called "presidential elections". Moscow also brought to Abkhazia several dozen so-called "international observers", in an attempt to legitimize the outcome of these "elections", and thus the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of people. It is unfortunate that many "observers" visited Abkhazia without prior knowledge of the situation on the ground or knowledge of being in violation of Georgian legislation.

There is no justification for such mockery of international law. No decision on the future of Abkhazia can be legitimate as long as approximately half a million displaced persons, three quarters of the original population of the region, are deprived of the right to participate in the decision-making.

Crimes committed by occupants and their puppet regime have fundamentally distorted the demographics of Abkhazia, Georgia, thus preventing internally displaced persons and refugees of Georgian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Greek, Azerbaijani, Estonian and other ethnic origin from returning to their homes. Moreover, the human rights of the remaining residents are violated on a daily basis by the occupation regime and no international observers are allowed into the occupied region to report on these abuses and on the ongoing illegal militarization. In the existing reality these "elections" clearly display a complete disregard of internationally accepted norms and principles and cannot be considered legitimate by any standard.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia appeals to all members of the international community to give an adequate assessment to another farce conducted in one of the occupied regions of Georgia, Abkhazia, and steadily continue the non-recognition policy with reference to both occupied regions.

United Nations S/2011/551

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 29 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to my previous correspondences on the situation in Southern Kordofan, in particular my letter dated 25 August 2011 (S/2011/539), through which I conveyed to you the unilateral decision of the Government of the Sudan to declare a ceasefire in Southern Kordofan, I have the honour to transmit to you the attached complaint letter dated 29 August 2011 from Mr. Ali Ahmed Karti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, regarding the continuous violations of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and SPLM/Northern Sector of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the interim period and after the independence of South Sudan, including their latest military activities in Southern Kordofan (see annex).

Having brought this complaint letter to your kind attention, I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

11-48474 (E) 010911 010911

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Annex to the letter dated 29 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

I find myself obliged to submit to you a complaint concerning past violations and encroachments by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan. Before I do so, however, I must first underline that the commitment of the Government of the Sudan to achieving political settlement and stability is beyond question. That commitment has been given practical expression by the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the subsequent undertaking to apply its provisions responsibly and credibly. Those provisions included the holding on 9 January 2011 of the referendum on the right of South Sudan to self-determination, the outcome of which we acknowledged. When South Sudan became an independent State, the Sudan was the first to recognize it and extend its support, as affirmed on 9 July 2011 in the city of Juba by the President of the Republic in his historic address, which is a testament to our unshakeable commitment to the choice of peace and stability.

In complete contrast to our own stance, that of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan has been antagonistic towards the mother State right from the start, when President Salva Kiir, on the day of the secession of South Sudan, sent negative messages in his address, some of which you may recall, including his affirmation of links with the rebels of Darfur, and his references to the two regions of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. It is therefore no surprise that South Sudan should adopt an aggressive stance towards the Government that granted it the right to self-determination. The Government of South Sudan began its flagrant violations by hosting the leaders of Darfuri rebel movements, providing them with camps, shelter and training, and supplying them with arms that they have used against the Government of the north. That support continues unabated. In early May 2011, under police cover and in blatant violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2,500 soldiers infiltrated into the Abyei region. The Government of South Sudan had already failed to give an undertaking that it would withdraw its forces south of the border that was agreed on 1 January 1956, and had similarly failed to undertake to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate its forces in Southern Kordofan. It then carried out treacherous military attacks on Sudan Armed Forces troops that formed part of the Joint Integrated Units, attacks which did not even spare peacekeepers from the United Nations Mission in Sudan. The Government of South Sudan went still further when, on 9 August 2011, with a view to coordinating joint military operations, it sponsored in the Kauda region in Southern Kordofan a conference that included representatives of Darfuri rebel movements and the leaders of the northern branch of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Participants, namely, Abul Qasim Imam al-Haj, for the Abdul Wahid Muhammad Nur faction; Al-Rih Mahmud, for the Minni Arcua Minawi faction; and Ramadan Nimr, for SPLM in Southern Kordofan, signed a document which provided for the overthrow of the Government of the Sudan by armed military operations.

Furthermore, SPLM is responsible for innumerable violations and encroachments in Southern Kordofan that include, inter alia, the repeated declaration, while preparations were being made for the election of the Governor of Southern Kordofan, that it would have recourse to the option of war if not satisfied

with the outcome of the elections. It had a very well-known slogan, *al-najmah au al-hajma* ("star or attack"), indicating that if their candidate Abdul Aziz Al-Helu, whose symbol was a star, did not win the election, they would resort to military operations. The Government of South Sudan was behind all the acts of aggression in Southern Kordofan, which it supported with arms and materiel. That Government had planned its military operations in Southern Kordofan well in advance, and those operations were launched in the regions of Um Dorein, Kauda and Kadugli as soon as the election results were announced. There are also direct routes between South Sudan and Southern Kordofan for the provision of military support to the northern branch of SPLM.

Notwithstanding the violations and encroachments of the Government of South Sudan and its continuous encouragement of and support for the northern branch of SPLM and the rebel movements in Darfur, which are aimed at igniting the security situation in the country, the Government of the Sudan has taken the initiative of announcing a unilateral two-week ceasefire in the region of Southern Kordofan and has even authorized a high-level commission to evaluate the humanitarian and human rights situations there. However, those constructive initiatives have met with no response from the Government of South Sudan, which continues to incite the northern branch of SPLM to wage war on its behalf in Southern Kordofan. The Security Council is responsible for safeguarding international peace and security and was, indeed, instrumental in bringing about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement: we refer here to the relevant Security Council resolutions, beginning with resolution 1574 (2004), which was adopted in Nairobi, the Council having left its headquarters in New York to convene in Nairobi in order to support the conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We therefore appeal to the Security Council to employ all means and powers at its disposal to persuade the Government of South Sudan to honour the agreements that have been signed by our two countries and desist forthwith from training, supporting and inciting armed rebel groups in Southern Kordofan and Darfur, and to urge those rebel groups in Southern Kordofan and Darfur to listen to the voice of reason and respond to the ceasefire declared by the Government by sitting down to direct talks which, through negotiation and discussion, may lead to a peaceful settlement.

(*Signed*) Ali Ahmed **Karti**
Minister for Foreign Affairs

United Nations S/2011/552

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 August 2011

Original: English

Preventive diplomacy: Delivering results

Report of the Secretary-General

This report is dedicated to the memory of former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld as we mark this year the fiftieth anniversary of his death in 1961.

*I believe we have only begun to explore the full potentialities of the United Nations as an instrument for multilateral diplomacy, especially the most useful combinations of public discussion on the one hand and private negotiations and mediation on the other.**

Summary

The present report examines the opportunities and the challenges the United Nations and its partners currently face in conducting preventive diplomacy in a changing political and security landscape.

Focusing specifically on diplomatic action taken to prevent or mitigate the spread of armed conflict, the report describes the relevance of preventive diplomacy across the conflict spectrum and as part of broader, nationally owned strategies to promote peace. It highlights the growing expectations placed on the United Nations system and other organizations in the area of conflict prevention and stresses the central importance of partnerships to this end.

The report illustrates how recent preventive diplomacy engagements have made a difference on the ground in a range of different contexts. It discusses the risks and obstacles that continue to hamper preventive efforts and identifies key elements which, in the experience of the United Nations and its partners, have proven critical in maximizing the success of these efforts: early warning, flexibility, partnerships, sustainability, evaluation and resources. The report concludes with recommendations to further strengthen international capacity for preventive diplomacy over the next five years.

* Extract from an address by former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 11 September 1954.

11-48261 (E) 080911

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I. Introduction

1. Preventive diplomacy has been an enduring idea at the United Nations for many decades. Since Dag Hammarskjöld first articulated the concept over half a century ago, it has continued to evolve in response to new challenges. An integral part of broader conflict prevention efforts, preventive diplomacy refers specifically to diplomatic action taken, at the earliest possible stage, "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".[1] Preventive diplomacy remains highly relevant along the entire conflict spectrum.

2. When I took office over four years ago, I made it a priority to re-energize the Organization's preventive diplomacy and to improve our machinery and expand our partnerships to that effect. My efforts were encouraged by Member States, which are themselves placing greater emphasis on conflict prevention and see a key role for the Organization in supporting and complementing their endeavours. There are several reasons for this renewed interest. Foremost is the recurring and devastating impact of armed conflict on individuals, societies and economies, coupled with the recognition — all the more acute in these strained financial times — that failure to prevent conflict is extremely costly. Moreover, although quiet successes rarely make the news, a number of recent engagements have reconfirmed that through a combination of analysis, early warning, rapid response and partnerships, we can help to defuse tensions in escalating crises and assist parties in resolving disputes peacefully.

3. Reflecting this support, the Security Council, under the presidency of Nigeria, held an open debate on preventive diplomacy in Africa on 16 July 2010. In the ensuing presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/14), I was requested to submit a report with recommendations on how best to optimize the use of preventive diplomacy tools within the United Nations system and in cooperation with regional and subregional organizations and other actors. The present report is prepared pursuant to that request.

II. The changing landscape

4. Preventive diplomacy today is being conducted by a broader array of actors, using a wider range of tools, than ever before. This is due in part to the emergence of stronger normative frameworks in favour of international efforts to prevent violent conflict and mass atrocities and to ensure the inclusion of more voices in governance, peace and security. The 2005 World Summit was a watershed moment, when Member States committed to building a "culture of prevention", strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to that end and taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace". Earlier, in its resolution 1325 (2000) the Security Council significantly called for greater participation of women in conflict prevention and recognized the importance of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms.

[1] See "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping" (A/47/277-S/24111), 17 June 1992.

5. Normative developments at the global level were underpinned by those at the regional level in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. On the African continent, most notably, the doctrine of non-interference has been replaced by the African Union's principle of "non-indifference" to imminent threats to peace, security and populations, including unconstitutional changes of government. A number of subregional organizations in Africa either anticipated or followed the new stance. In the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) has made the resolution of differences that may lead to crises a priority. New groupings, such as the Union of South American Nations, have become active regional players, including in preventive diplomacy.[2] Other examples include the Pacific region, where the Biketawa Declaration of the Pacific Island Forum (2000) provided a framework for early diplomatic response to emerging security concerns. The 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, the 2005 Charter of the Francophonie, the 2007 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 2008 Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference[3] (OIC) are all reflective of a growing expectation that emerging crises should be addressed in a timely manner by the appropriate regional or international forums. As a result, we have witnessed, to varying degrees, a shift to more proactive preventive diplomacy in different regions of the world.

6. To give life to these normative innovations, the past decade has also seen the creation of new preventive capacities across the international community, in international and regional organizations and in many Member States. These include the development of early warning systems[4] and targeted funding mechanisms for rapid response,[5] the establishment of dedicated prevention structures[6] and the ongoing use of special envoys. The Mediation Support Unit established at the United Nations in 2006 has become a service provider to both United Nations and non-United Nations mediation efforts, and an increasing number of regional organizations are seeking to enhance their own mediation capacities.[7] Political missions are increasingly being used; in 2010, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and OAS deployed almost 50 such missions in the field, many with a preventive diplomacy

[2] Declaration of the Council of Heads of State and Government of the Union of South American Nations, Buenos Aires, 4 May 2010, para. 5.

[3] In June 2011, the name of the Organization was changed to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

[4] For example, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union and a number of African subregional organizations have developed early warning systems.

[5] Examples include the European Union's Instrument for Stability, the flexible financing mechanism for rapid response set up by the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund.

[6] For example, the Member State-supported strengthening, in 2008, of the Department of Political Affairs, the Panel of the Wise of the African Union, the Council of the Wise of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), new structures of the European External Action Service of the European Union, such as the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy and, within that, the Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Mediation Unit.

[7] For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations have concluded a joint mediation partnership, which includes the funding of a mediation fellow to be based at OAS; joint mediation training for Member State officials; and support to the development of an OAS expert roster, after-action review methodologies and gender strategy.

and good offices mandate.[8] The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has helped to defuse tensions over national minority issues in many countries through quiet diplomacy.

7. Despite serious challenges that continue to hamper preventive diplomacy efforts, which will be discussed later in this report, there are growing indications that our collective efforts at prevention are responding better to the needs on the ground. The number of low-intensity conflicts that started in the period from 2000 to 2009 is only roughly half as high as those that started in the 1990s. In the same period, the number of new high-intensity conflicts (onsets and escalations) also dropped, from 21 to 16.[9] While a number of factors explain this decline, more and better preventive action by Member States and international organizations is an important part of the story.

III. Making a difference on the ground

8. In the face of political tensions or escalating crises, preventive diplomacy is often one of the few options available, short of coercive measures, to preserve peace. It is also potentially a high-return investment. The biggest return comes in lives saved. However, prevention also makes strong economic sense. The World Bank has calculated that "the average cost of civil war is equivalent to more than 30 years of gross domestic product (GDP) growth for a medium-size developing country".[10] The most severe civil wars impose cumulative costs of tens of billions of dollars, and recovery to original growth paths takes the society concerned an average of 14 years.[10] By contrast, prevention efforts can be much less costly: the United Nations Office for West Africa, which has played an important role in prevention efforts in Guinea, the Niger and elsewhere in the subregion, has a regular budget of less than $8 million per year.

9. The following section seeks to highlight ways in which the United Nations is using its existing instruments, honing new ones and working with key actors in new and creative partnerships to make a difference on the ground through diplomacy.

A. Key actors, tools and instruments

General Assembly

10. Pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly has broad authority to consider conflict prevention in all its aspects; develop recommendations as appropriate; or call the attention of the Security Council to situations that are likely to endanger international peace and security.

[8] See Richard Gowan, ed., *Review of Political Missions 2010* (Center on International Cooperation, 2010).

[9] Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2010, 1946-2009 available from http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/19/19228_UCDP_PRIO_ArmedConflictDataset_V4_2010.xls.

[10] See World Bank, *2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* (Washington, D.C., 2011).

11. Through its norm-setting capacity and deliberative functions, the General Assembly has a central role in contributing to a conducive environment for conflict prevention. Its adoption, on 22 June 2011, of a consensus resolution aimed at strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention and resolution (resolution 65/283) is a groundbreaking development that positions the Organization as a setter of standards for mediation and provides a broad framework for productive collaboration with Member States, regional organizations and other mediation actors. As the Organization's supreme budgetary authority, the General Assembly also reviews and approves the budgets of political missions and other instruments relating to conflict prevention and peacemaking. In 2008, it made possible the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, with a view to bolstering the Organization's preventive capacity. Furthermore, at the request of the Assembly, I am submitting to its sixty-sixth session a report containing recommendations on improved funding and backstopping of our special political missions, with the aim of ensuring more flexible and rapid deployment of this increasingly mandated instrument.

Security Council

12. As the United Nations organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council has a key role to play in the prevention of armed conflict. In the past, the Council focused largely on dealing with conflicts and emergencies after they occurred, but recent years have seen a push for greater engagement and flexibility in addressing emerging threats before they are placed on the Council's formal agenda. For example, since early 2008, the Council has held "informal interactive dialogues" on a range of situations, which are intended to promote a more proactive approach to preventive diplomacy. It has requested the Department of Political Affairs to deliver monthly "horizon scanning" briefings that focus on current and emerging conflicts. I also use our informal monthly luncheons with the Security Council to raise many items that are not on any formal agenda. Since 2007, the thematic item "peace and security in Africa" has served to address a variety of country-specific issues in formal meetings, including situations not officially on the Council's agenda, such as, in the early stages, Libya.

13. How, and how early, the Security Council should become involved in a situation of concern is a question that must be answered on a case-by-case basis. At times, the Council decides to keep its clout in reserve, in order to leave space for quiet diplomacy and the good offices of the Secretary-General. In other instances, highly visible and decisive action by the Council, such as missions to the field, initiatives by its President and press communiqués, has opened political space for prevention which otherwise would not have existed, strongly supporting my efforts.

14. When the Security Council forms a common vision for addressing a situation of concern, as it did in the case of Guinea's constitutional crisis in 2009 and 2010 and the Southern Sudan 2011 independence referendum, it has proven its effectiveness in generating political momentum and engaging with key interlocutors in pursuit of a common strategy. The Council has begun to develop stronger and more structured relationships with regional organizations to that effect. Council support for mediation initiatives, whether undertaken by the United Nations or regional actors, has also proven crucial. At later stages of a conflict, more coercive tools such as targeted sanctions have added critical leverage to diplomatic efforts. The Security Council also plays a unique role in preventing the escalation of

conflict or a slide back into war by establishing political and peacekeeping missions with appropriate mandates.

Peacebuilding Commission

15. The Peacebuilding Commission, which is an intergovernmental advisory body of the Security Council and the General Assembly, ensures sustained international attention to countries emerging from conflict, including to the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict. Six countries are currently on the Commission's agenda: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Country-specific configurations of the Commission have been established in each case, which could help to prevent relapse into violence through representation efforts by their Chairs and my Special Representatives.

Good offices of the Secretary-General

16. My mandate for conflict prevention originates in Article 99 of the Charter, which provides that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. Successive Secretaries-General have used their good offices to help parties find solutions to problems at the earliest possible stage. The effectiveness of the good offices is often a function of how much political space the Secretary-General has in which to act. In my own experience, the most difficult scenario is when international interest is strong but conflicted, because the parties know that there is no unity of vision. As a custodian of the Charter, I also have the duty to speak out in certain situations, an obligation which may or may not enhance mediation efforts. At times, public advocacy in full view of the media is necessary; more often, however, good offices are deployed behind the scenes. Irrespective of the approach, the key is to practise diplomacy that is as determined as it is flexible.

17. The Department of Political Affairs serves as the main operational arm for the conduct of my good offices. With regular and extrabudgetary support from the Member States,[11] the Department was strengthened over the past three years to play its lead role in preventive diplomacy within the United Nations system more effectively. It has enhanced its analytical capacities, its technical expertise in key areas such as electoral assistance, its partnerships and its ability to learn lessons, distil best practices and facilitate system-wide responses. As a result, it is becoming better geared towards rapid response and, through its reinforced regional divisions and Mediation Support Unit, can assist good offices and mediation initiatives worldwide, whether undertaken by the Organization or its partners. Its standby team of mediation experts is able to deploy within 72 hours to assist negotiators on peace process design, security arrangements, constitution-making, gender, power-sharing and wealth-sharing. A dedicated mechanism, supported by voluntary contributions, provides more flexible financing for rapid response.

[11] Regular budget strengthening was approved in General Assembly resolution 63/261, and I elaborated on that strengthening in A/65/161. With only half of the requested posts approved by the General Assembly, and with increasing Member State demands for Department of Political Affairs core capacities, the Department recently received increased extrabudgetary support. See http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/annualreport_13052011.

Envoys

18. Over the past few years, I have appointed envoys to help to defuse tensions and resolve problems in the context of border disputes, territorial questions, regional conflicts, constitutional and electoral crises, reunification negotiations, peace talks and a range of other issues. My special advisers on the prevention of genocide, the responsibility to protect and other important cross-cutting concerns bring specific thematic expertise to the table. In many cases, United Nations envoys have played a key role in pulling a country or region back from the brink of conflict.

19. For example, in the autumn of 2008, I appointed former Nigerian President, General Olusegun Obasanjo, as Special Envoy for the Great Lakes in the context of growing tension and a widespread fear that the Democratic Republic of the Congo would again become the theatre of regional war. With backstopping from Headquarters and in close consultation with the United Nations peacekeeping operation on the ground, the Special Envoy engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy in search of a negotiated peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Collaborating with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, these efforts resulted, within just a few weeks, in complex peace talks under United Nations auspices, made possible through the rapid deployment of a mediation support team, together with associated logistics, translation services and conference and travel support. By March 2009, the talks had led to a set of agreements foreseeing the demobilization and disarmament of rebel groups and measures to address their underlying grievances. With ongoing engagement by the Special Envoy to monitor progress, the bulk of the commitments were implemented within less than a year. In late 2009, Presidents Kagame and Kabila met for the first time in many years, and shortly thereafter Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo resumed formal diplomatic relations. While the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains serious in terms of generalized insecurity and humanitarian suffering, renewed regional war was averted.

20. In other instances, the Organization has played a supportive role. In January 2008, for example, amid post-election violence in Kenya, the African Union mandated a process chaired by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to avert further deterioration into a civil war along ethnic lines. This effort was strongly supported by the United Nations country team on the ground and staff secondments from the Department of Political Affairs, drawing strategically on expert advice from the Department's Electoral Assistance Division and other actors. The power-sharing agreement reached not only served to avert conflict but also provided the basis for a new constitution. Similarly, in Madagascar, a United Nations mediation support team has been deployed to assist the mediation efforts of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) aimed at resolving the political crisis in the country and restoring constitutional order.

21. Many of the instruments we are developing to increase the impact of preventive diplomacy, such as rapidly deployable funding and technical expertise, are also benefiting envoys who are working to resolve current conflicts. One example is Libya, where my Special Envoy is working to arrive at a political resolution of the conflict in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) and to prevent further humanitarian suffering. Other envoys are engaged in long-term political processes which the United Nations has a special responsibility to facilitate, such as those in Cyprus and Western Sahara. In some

instances, the very existence of a process has intrinsic preventive value, as it can serve as a valve to release tensions, build confidence and ensure that the parties continue to talk to each other.

Regional offices

22. A critical innovation in recent years is the establishment of the United Nations regional offices which serve, inter alia, as forward platforms for preventive diplomacy in West Africa, Central Asia and, since March 2011, Central Africa. The former two have already forged sustained, innovative working relationships with local, regional and other actors to address a broad range of potentially explosive issues throughout their subregions.

23. In 2010, for example, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was able to provide immediate good offices and support for crisis response in Kyrgyzstan, following the ouster of the former President in April and the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in June. Working closely with national actors, the United Nations country team, OSCE, the European Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Centre facilitated assistance for reconstruction, recovery and elections in the country, while fostering a dialogue between political leaders and civil society representatives and helping to lay the groundwork for reconciliation.

24. In Guinea, the United Nations Office for West Africa partnered with ECOWAS, the African Union, the International Contact Group and others in facilitating the country's transition from military to constitutional rule throughout 2009 and 2010. Preventing political tensions from escalating into full-blown conflict was a major preoccupation during that period, not least because of the potential destabilization of neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Through steady support to the political process and to the ECOWAS-led mediation, the United Nations assisted Guineans in steering the transition to its completion through the inauguration, in December 2010, of Alpha Condé, Guinea's first President elected through democratic multiparty elections.

25. The mandate of the new United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa is to make a similar contribution to preventing conflict in the subregion and to help to address such cross-border challenges as arms trafficking, organized crime and the presence of armed groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army.

Resident political missions

26. The critical importance of peacekeeping operations in the Organization's overall peace and security toolkit has been recognized for decades. Less well-known is the role played by its much smaller political missions, which are increasingly relied upon to deliver on a range of complex peacemaking and peacebuilding mandates.

27. Political missions vary widely in terms of their purpose, activities, size and scope. They include the regional offices described above, a new liaison office to the African Union, sizeable operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and a number of much

lighter peacemaking and peacebuilding offices.[12] Most are deployed in crisis management mode rather than for a purely preventive objective. However, all accompany complex political or peace consolidation processes, and their mandates tend to include a good offices role, typically carried out by the head of mission.

28. Working with host or partner Governments and other actors, these missions routinely assist with national initiatives to foster dialogue, build capacity, ease tension and prevent violence. The steady political accompaniment they provide and their success in addressing problems before they escalate have been significant albeit often low-profile. The role of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq in facilitating dialogue over the city of Kirkuk and other disputed internal territories and in smoothing the path to elections in 2009 and 2010 shows the value of civilian assistance missions working the political track alongside military operations deployed by other actors. The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process has been working continuously to promote calm and alleviate tensions in the region. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office helped to prevent the potential escalation of violence following tensions between the governing and opposition parties in March 2009. From Afghanistan and Nepal to the Middle East, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia, United Nations political missions have worked in recent years to support dialogue among key actors and to shore up political and peace processes. In nearly every case, more integrated approaches and structures in these missions have allowed the Organization to embed conflict prevention in longer-term peacebuilding strategies, enhancing the prospects of a more durable peace.

Peacekeeping operations

29. Given that, as recent World Bank findings show, 90 per cent of civil wars in the past decade took place in countries that had already experienced a civil war in the previous 30 years,[10] all United Nations missions serve as an important first line of crisis response and represent assets for preventive diplomacy across the conflict spectrum. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations have been playing this role for many years — strengthened, as needed, by the parallel role of a special envoy. The Southern Sudan self-determination referendum in January 2011 presents a recent example of how a peacekeeping mission can help to steer complex peace processes through delicate transitions.

30. In the year running up to the referendum, the mission leadership, working closely alongside the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on the Sudan, mediated between the central Sudanese Government and the Government of Southern Sudan, breaking deadlocks at key moments. My Special Representative also helped to align the international community to exercise its influence and

[12] The United Nations resident political missions include the following: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process; Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus; United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI); United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA); United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL); United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS); United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA); United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB); United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS); United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions; and United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission.

assisted the African Union Panel in facilitating negotiations on post-referendum arrangements. Complementing the efforts of the mission and significant technical and logistical electoral assistance, I also deployed a Panel on the Referenda in the Sudan, headed by the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa, at the request of the parties. My Panel and its staff monitored the pre-referendum atmosphere, provided high-level good offices and built confidence among the parties. In January 2011, 3 million people across the Sudan and abroad went to the poll in a largely peaceful atmosphere, voting overwhelmingly for secession. While the situation in the region remains fragile with key challenges ahead, the absence of major violence around the referendum itself and the widespread acceptance of its outcome were viewed as a success for preventive diplomacy.

Groups of friends and other diplomatic support

31. Coordination of international efforts is indispensable and is often carried out by contact groups and "groups of friends". Such groups have played an important role in, for example, Guinea, Libya, Mauritania and Western Sahara. When they are united, these formations can act as a multiplier of diplomatic efforts, bringing collective influence, resources and expertise to bear. They can further provide a constituency for the envoy, help to uphold key demands and principles, and ensure that the international community speaks with one voice, stays focused and aligns aid behind strategy.

Fact-finding, inquiries and investigations

32. Member States faced with situations of politically sensitive crimes, violent incidents or alleged grave human rights violations have increasingly turned to the Organization to conduct impartial inquiries. Some of these have been mandated by the Security Council or by the Human Rights Council, while others have been established by the Secretary-General. The entities created are as diverse as the situations and requests they respond to. Though not part of the traditional conflict prevention toolkit, these mechanisms have, in recent years, been effectively leveraged to support preventive diplomacy efforts, helping to shift the calculations of the parties, defuse tensions and build confidence. For instance, a joint fact-finding inquiry carried out with ECOWAS into the deaths of Ghanaian migrants found in the Gambia in 2007 was seen as helpful in rebuilding relations between the two countries. Other examples include the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, created in 2007 to help the country to investigate and dismantle clandestine criminal networks; the Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events of 28 September 2009 in Conakry; and the Panel of Inquiry on the Gaza flotilla incident of 31 May 2010.

United Nations country teams

33. When political tensions arise in countries where the United Nations has neither an envoy nor a mission, resident coordinators and country teams are frequently propelled to the forefront of facilitating a response and assisting national actors in addressing emerging challenges. In recognition of this reality, we have worked to improve both the immediate assistance the United Nations can provide to our teams on the ground in such situations and the services we can offer to the country concerned. In recent years, such services have included assistance to locally led

mediation efforts and technical expertise on electoral processes, constitutional reforms, truth commissions, national dialogues, reconciliation talks and the creation of national dispute resolution mechanisms. Characteristically, this kind of support is provided discreetly, with minimal resources and as a complement to ongoing development and governance programmes.

34. For example, in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere in the region, resident coordinators and country teams, with enhanced support from Headquarters, played an important role in facilitating the Organization's response to the Arab Spring by supporting dialogue initiatives, fostering processes to share comparative experiences of transitions or offering focused technical advice. In the context of the political crisis in Honduras, a strengthened Resident Coordinator's office provided expertise on a broad range of issues related to the national reconciliation process initiated by the Government of President Porfirio Lobo in January 2010. In order to defuse political tensions in the Comoros, the Resident Coordinator co-chaired, with the President of the National Electoral Commission, a monitoring and transparency committee that brought together political parties, civil society and the international community in the run-up to the Presidential elections in 2010. In Fiji, the United Nations supported, through its team on the ground, efforts to maintain a conversation between the military Government, civil society and other stakeholders in a round-table process focusing on peace and development.

B. New areas of focus

35. In recent years, the United Nations has increasingly been asked to act in preventive diplomacy mode in the context of such severe constitutional crises as unconstitutional changes of government and violent electoral disputes.

Response to unconstitutional changes of government

36. Coups d'état and coup attempts run counter to democratic norms and the rule of law and have a potentially detrimental effect on governance and human rights. In addition, they frequently serve as a trigger of violent conflict, having set off, according to one count, roughly two dozen civil wars since 1945.[13] In this context, the Organization has become increasingly active in helping countries to return to constitutional order. Over the past three years, we have deployed senior envoys to facilitate or mediate, in partnership with regional or subregional organizations, the resolution of crises in the aftermath of military coups and revolts in Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania and the Niger. With the exception of Madagascar, where the crisis remains unresolved, these facilitation efforts, empowered by increasingly strong regional frameworks against unconstitutional changes of government, have been critical in paving the way to a return to constitutional order.

37. In the cases of Guinea, Mauritania and the Niger, my Dakar-based Special Representative shuttled among the actors, making the case to the de facto authorities for a return to constitutionality, ensuring coordination of the international community and offering advice to the lead regional organization. In Madagascar, the United Nations made significant substantive and technical contributions to the

[13] James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 41, No. 3.

Maputo and Addis Ababa agreements, unfortunately as yet unimplemented. In all cases, mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts drew heavily on the Organization's technical expertise in power-sharing and constitutional and electoral questions.

Election-related violence prevention

38. The majority of elections held around the world are positive expressions of the right of peoples to freely choose their leaders. In fragile situations, they have the potential to unify and to consolidate peace. However, in certain circumstances, elections also have the potential to divide and destabilize, as recently observed in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Zimbabwe. This risk is particularly high in countries with systemic, long-standing and unresolved grievances, combined with a "winner takes all" approach to competitive politics. As domestic and international scrutiny grows and the flow of information increases, the potential for elections to be contested may increase, which could further heighten the possibility of election-related violent conflict. Consequently, the United Nations is working with partners, including regional organizations, to develop a broader approach to preventing election-related violence that combines mediation, good offices and electoral assistance expertise.

39. This approach seeks to offer support in addressing underlying grievances, even in a limited way, by, for example, encouraging the design of political institutions to prevent the monopoly of power. It also encourages inclusive election processes; the establishment of election management bodies that enjoy broad trust and confidence; adequate measures to enfranchise all eligible voters; transparency in all phases of the process; and a fair, expeditious and accessible dispute resolution mechanism.

40. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Organization is working closely with all stakeholders to create the best possible technical and political environment for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, which are seen as a pivotal step in sustaining the peacebuilding process in the country. In addition, we have deployed a number of election-related good offices missions in recent years, which helped to increase confidence in the election processes while seeking to mitigate the risk of violence. Such missions were deployed in, for example, Guinea, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, the Niger and Papua New Guinea (Bougainville). I have mentioned already our efforts with regard to the Sudan referendum.

IV. Key challenges and elements for success

41. While preventive diplomacy has grown and evolved significantly, it is neither easy nor straightforward nor inevitably successful. It continues to face great obstacles and long odds, with success often hostage to multiple factors, one of the most critical of which is the will of the parties. If the parties do not want peace or are unwilling to compromise, it is extraordinarily difficult, especially for outsiders, to persuade them otherwise. In such cases, the linkage between preventive diplomacy and the power to produce incentives and disincentives can be critical to convince key actors, with due respect for their sovereignty, that there is value in choosing dialogue over violence and, if necessary, to accept external assistance to that end.

42. In situations of internal crisis in particular, there may be concerns about undue interference or unwanted "internationalization" of a country's internal affairs. A lack of openings for engagement can tie the international community's hands while the human cost climbs in a visibly deteriorating situation — at which point, ironically, the space for political action sometimes opens up. In the face of a particularly grave or imminent threat to international peace and security, diplomacy alone may not be effective and may need to be complemented by other forms of leverage including, if necessary, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

43. Nevertheless, despite the myriad challenges, steps can be taken to maximize diplomacy's chances of success. Key elements which, in the experience of the United Nations and many of our partners, have proven essential in that respect are described below.

A. Early warning

44. Although early warning has expanded and improved, its context has changed over the past decade. Only a few years ago, information on brewing situations around the globe was scant; the challenge was to obtain more of it. Today, the challenge is, in some ways, the reverse: information is voluminous and must be sifted, evaluated and integrated. However, predicting crises remains an uncertain business, and the international community is still, on occasion, taken by surprise, as it was by the ethnically targeted violence that ripped through southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 and the timing of the wave of popular unrest that has shaken the Middle East and North Africa in 2011.

45. Cooperation within the United Nations on early warning has improved. Specialized parts of the system such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities are playing a key role in filtering information and drawing attention to such dangerous indicators as patterns of human rights violations or hate speech, which might otherwise escape detection. Similarly, closer cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS, both of which operate early warning systems, has ensured more and better data. However, the extent to which we pool our analysis of these data still varies. Above all, there is a need for us to better anticipate those "threshold moments" when parties to a conflict decide, or feel compelled, to use or escalate violence to achieve their aims. The more we understand the motives and calculations of key actors, the better we will be able to tailor a preventive response.

46. Our analysis of any situation improves with proximity, local knowledge and regular contact with a multitude of actors. In addition to its partners in regional and subregional organizations, the United Nations has begun to work more closely with civil society, parliaments, the business community, influential academic institutions and think tanks on the ground. Women's groups in particular play an important role in early warning. We must continue to expand these critical networks, which have significantly increased our analytical capacities.

47. No matter how accurate the early warning, the real test is whether it leads to early action. The difference between a successful engagement and one that is likely to fail can often be measured in the time lapsed between the first warning signs of a

problem and the first steps taken to address it. This "warning-to-action continuum" is the challenge the international community can find hardest to meet, for a variety of reasons, as described in this report. However, even if the actions taken are small, for example a statement of concern by the Security Council, the deployment of a fact-finding mission or a well-timed démarche by the Secretary-General, these can have a more important effect on the calculations of key actors than a larger but more slowly developed response. This is true especially when these actions clearly signal a sustained focus by the international community.

B. Flexibility

48. Conflicts are by nature dynamic and unpredictable. Intra-State wars, for example start and stop frequently. They can suddenly both deepen and widen. Every intervention to prevent, transform, manage or resolve conflict must therefore be flexible, configured to the needs on the ground and not according to our institutional set-ups. This holds particularly true for preventive diplomacy, precisely because much of its value lies in its adaptability.

49. Different regions, societies and groups tend to prefer different preventive diplomacy approaches. Indirect talks (between third parties and one party to a dispute) appear to be the preferred model in some regions, while direct talks (between parties to a dispute) are significantly more common in others.[14] In some regions, independent actors not affiliated with larger institutions will have comparative advantages that others do not. Whatever the approach chosen, and whoever carries it out, our engagements are more likely to succeed if they take into account local preferences and remain flexible, while pursuing clear objectives.

50. We work in a highly fluid geopolitical landscape and must also show flexibility in adapting our tools to address changing patterns of violence. Countries stricken by armed conflict today often see a concomitant rise in transnational organized crime, in particular trafficking in people, drugs and looted resources. This often complicates efforts to end conflict and fuels high levels of violence even in the post-conflict phase. Our existing preventive diplomacy tools could help to address these challenges by reinforcing a series of regional and global efforts to curb transnational organized crime and by feeding into a long-term effort to help fragile countries to strengthen the rule of law.

C. Partnerships

51. Regional and subregional organizations have a unique influence on, leverage over, and access to crisis situations in their region. The framers of the Charter of the United Nations were visionaries in foreseeing a global collective security architecture with a clear role for regional arrangements. In the richly complex landscape we face today, the United Nations is working increasingly in tandem with regional actors in a variety of ways: in a lead role, in a supporting role, in a burden-sharing role, in sequential deployments and in several joint operations.

[14] See the data set entitled "Managing low-intensity intra-State conflict" of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University, Sweden, which covers 122 such conflicts during the period from 1993 to 2004.

52. In the past five years, we have deepened existing or established new conflict prevention and mediation partnerships with the African Union, the European Union, OSCE, OAS, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), ECOWAS, SADC, ASEAN, OIC and others. Partly through the use of extrabudgetary resources, we have been able to undertake initiatives to help to build regional capacities and learn from regional experiences. Joint training programmes on a broad range of peace and security issues are now available. Still, synergies take time and hard work to attain and are not rendered easier by the fact that, with very few exceptions,[15] the United Nations, regional organizations and other actors have no shared mechanism or procedure to decide, in real time, who should do what in a given case. As we work to improve our formal institutional channels and protocols in that regard, we are also investing in key personal relationships with regional partners, which form the bedrock of closer cooperation.

53. Meanwhile, our cooperation with the World Bank and other international financial institutions in fragile and conflict-affected States has grown over the past few years, and we have seen real benefits when the leverage of these institutions, based on the unique incentives only they can offer, is lined up behind a common diplomatic effort. We welcome the publication by the World Bank of the *2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* as an important contribution to our combined efforts to address these critical linkages.

54. The role of independent mediators is increasingly important, and we have begun to forge closer links with some of these. We have also reached out to other actors in the field of preventive diplomacy, such as elders' groups, civil society organizations, women's groups, think tanks, academia, the media and the business community. A necessary shift is under way to improve the way we work with civil society, especially women and young people, who are often marginalized and yet can lead the charge for peaceful change.

55. Lastly, we are working to improve partnerships within the United Nations system itself, integrating our numerous, though often disparate, tools to maximize the impact of our preventive efforts. The recent engagement in Guinea, for example, required the involvement of the Security Council, my personal intervention and over 40 working visits to Conakry by my Special Representative in Dakar. It also required effective leadership and backstopping from the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Office for West Africa, the active contribution of the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team, a United Nations-led Commission of Inquiry and the opening of a new OHCHR office, as well as the assistance of political analysts, electoral experts and mediation advisers alongside development, humanitarian, human rights and security sector specialists. Critical contributions were also made by our Peacebuilding Fund, which supported both the ECOWAS mediation and a dedicated security force to safeguard the electoral process. At one key juncture, a United Nations helicopter on loan from our Liberia mission ensured the transport of time-sensitive electoral materials from remote areas to Conakry.

[15] The United Nations and the African Union recently finalized joint guidelines for mediation partnerships.

D. Sustainability

56. Preventive diplomacy typically engages official decision makers during periods of rising political tensions or emerging crises. Once the impasse is resolved or the critical moment has passed, preventive diplomacy efforts tend to scale back down, leaving the question of how diplomatic gains can be sustained. In the context of post-conflict mediation, much importance has been ascribed in recent years to the durability of peace agreements. Although preventive diplomacy engagements do not necessarily lead to formal agreements, the most successful ones have assisted national counterparts in laying the foundations for a longer-term process to address underlying causes of conflict, as the Annan mediation did in Kenya in 2008. Key in this regard are locally designed and owned institutions that can prevent conflict through championing dialogue and providing a forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes. In a number of contexts, these have become known as "national infrastructures for peace".

57. In parallel with building national resources for conflict prevention, quiet international or regional facilitation must remain available longer than has generally been the case to date, in the event that it is needed at specific junctures.[10] The Peacebuilding Commission as well as our regional offices, in-country political missions, and country teams have an important role to play in this regard.

58. In order to be durable, preventive diplomacy engagements must also be broadened from the circle of decision makers and senior officials to civil society at large. However, working with civil society leaders towards lasting solutions frequently exceeds the terms of reference — and capacity — of an envoy whose main focus is Track I preventive diplomacy. Ideally, therefore, envoys and their teams should develop joint strategies and a division of labour with United Nations and other actors on the ground who are engaged in longer-term peacebuilding efforts. Non-governmental organizations that specialize in supporting Track II and "people-to-people" Track III diplomacy can also be valuable interlocutors in such contexts.

E. Evaluation

59. We know when preventive diplomacy is effective, but proving this empirically is difficult. Our existing assessment frameworks are not well-suited to the complex realities we find on the ground, and important political outcomes can be hard to quantify. Further, in the words of former Secretary-General Pérez de Cuellar, "no one will ever know how many conflicts have been prevented or limited through contacts which have taken place in the famous glass mansion, which can become fairly opaque when necessary".[16] Quiet diplomacy lives on in the oral tradition of the United Nations, of regional organizations or of a council of elders, but its intricacies are rarely committed to paper.

60. However, we know that, in an era of budgetary hardship and scrutiny from treasuries and voters alike, we must improve our ability to monitor outcomes, measure impact, present hard evidence that prevention works and communicate

[16] Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988).

success. The more we do, the more we learn what is effective and what is not. Within the Organization, we have made strides over the past few years in documenting engagements, analysing lessons and distilling promising practice.

F. Resources

61. Diplomacy is an intensely personal craft, and our most valuable resources are human. To be effective, mediators and envoys must possess credibility, an intangible quality which is hard to acquire and easy to lose. They must know how to earn trust and inspire confidence, working on the basis of discretion, impartiality, transparency and confidentiality. They must also be able to project the conviction that even the most intractable problem is solvable. These are not skills that are easily assessed. The "human factor" in diplomacy is the most uncertain, the hardest to plan for, and yet arguably the most pivotal in making any preventive diplomacy engagement work. The best tools and strategies are worth little without the right people to use them and to execute them.

62. Accordingly, the Organization has devoted considerable energy over the past few years to improving its rosters of senior envoys, mediators and experts who can be deployed to fragile situations around the globe. We count on our partnerships with Member States, regional actors and others to expand our mutual networks in this respect. The recently released independent report of the Senior Advisory Group on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/65/747-S/2011/85, annex) also makes a number of valuable recommendations for strengthening rosters and enhancing their interoperability. I have established a steering committee that will propose ways to operationalize these recommendations.

63. However, even the most experienced envoys cannot do it alone. At the United Nations, we are invested in building up a cadre of staff who can provide high-quality support and backstopping to senior envoys and eventually join their ranks. We are redoubling efforts to promote Headquarters-field mobility. Through our Mediation Support Unit and other capacities in the system, we are also working to improve the technical expertise we can offer our envoys on key thematic and practical concerns.

64. Preventive diplomacy is cost-effective but needs continued financial investment to deliver results. In 2010, the Security Council reaffirmed the need to provide the Organization with "predictable, coherent and timely financial support to optimize the use of preventive diplomacy tools".[17] Voluntary contributions remain essential to permit fast and flexible responses to crises and to peacemaking opportunities that arise. Their availability allows us to complement the stability and predictability of the regular budget with a genuine rapid response capability, and I encourage Member States to continue to provide this support.

[17] Statement of the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2010/14), adopted during the Security Council open debate on "Maintenance of international peace and security: optimizing the use of preventive diplomacy tools: prospects and challenges in Africa", on 16 July 2010.

V. Observations and thoughts on the way forward

65. The Security Council requested that I submit a report making recommendations on how best to optimize the use of preventive diplomacy tools within the United Nations system and in cooperation with regional organizations and other actors. In this report, I have set out innovations and evolving practices of recent years, the tools at our disposal and the main challenges that we continue to face. There are a number of issues raised in this report which, if successfully addressed, would help to smooth the path ahead as we pursue our forward agenda.

66. We should build on the improvements that have been made in the United Nations and in various regional and subregional organizations in developing early warning mechanisms. The establishment of regular and informal early warning dialogues between the United Nations and regional and other partners would allow us to pool information and help us to anticipate "threshold moments" when key actors might decide to use violence. However, early warning is useful only if it leads to early action, and we need to consider a broader range of options for addressing an emerging threat, including seemingly small steps, such as multi-actor statements of concern or fact-finding missions, which can affect the calculations of parties on the ground early on.

67. We must also continue our efforts to invest in and better equip "preventive diplomats", who lead our efforts on the ground to avert violent conflict. We will need to expand our pool of highly skilled envoys and mediators who can be deployed rapidly to situations of concern, with a focus on increasing the number of senior female mediators.[18] Once deployed, they need to be able to easily and rapidly draw on top-notch thematic expertise, such as the in-high-demand services of the Standby Team of Mediation Experts. A longer-term priority for the United Nations, regional organizations and Member States is to invest in the training of staff to support senior envoys and mediators and eventually join their ranks.

68. Preventive diplomacy needs adequate financial investment to deliver results. In particular with regard to rapid response capabilities, I appeal to Member States to ensure predictable and timely financial support. At the same time, we will continue our work to maximize the impact of the resources we already have.

69. The United Nations has come a long way in developing partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, Member States and civil society in the area of conflict prevention. However, to live up to our full potential in this field, we need to further strengthen these relationships, in particular those with regional partners. We see scope for a more strategic dialogue on issues of potential concern, as well as a more regular exchange of views and information at the working level. In crisis situations, we need to be able to decide quickly on who can do what to help. The Security Council may wish to build on recent efforts and develop stronger relationships with regional organizations.

70. We also need to recognize that internationally led preventive diplomacy efforts might serve only to avert violence in the short term. Ultimately, only national mechanisms and institutions can sustainably prevent violent conflict in the long run. We will therefore continue to prioritize support to national capacities for mediation,

[18] See the report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities (S/2009/189, para. 62 (f)).

facilitation and dialogue, and to assist our counterparts at their request in building national systems for conflict prevention. We must also improve the way we work with civil society, especially women and young people, who can be key agents for peaceful change.

71. In conclusion, preventive diplomacy today is delivering concrete results, with relatively modest resources, in many regions of the world, helping to save lives and to protect development gains. It is an approach that may not be effective in all situations and will continue to face the uncertainty, risks and evolving challenges which, in a sense, come with the terrain. However, I firmly believe that better preventive diplomacy is not optional; it is necessary.

72. With increasing knowledge, stronger partnerships and better instruments, I am convinced that it is possible to further strengthen the international community's capacity for preventive diplomacy in the interest of peace, security and development. This has been an enduring idea at the United Nations, and one that manifestly has a future. Preventive diplomacy will remain a key priority for the Organization throughout my second term as Secretary-General, and I count on the support of Member States, regional organizations, civil society and other partners as we collectively take this work forward. It is, without doubt, one of the smartest investments we can make.

United Nations S/2011/553

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 September 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 1 September 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to call your attention to my letter dated 25 August 2011 (S/2011/539) addressed to you regarding the unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by the Government of the Sudan in Southern Kordofan; my letter dated 17 August 2011 (S/2011/522), regarding the composition of a national commission to assess the human rights situation in Southern Kordofan; and my letter dated 29 August 2011 and its annex, which contains a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ali Ahmed Karti (S/2011/551), regarding the violations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement committed by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan during the interim period and after the independence of the South. The three letters are self-explanatory; they demonstrate the good and genuine will of the Government of the Sudan to resolve the conflict in Southern Kordofan through a peaceful settlement while the other party did not heed the call of peace. While providing you with this information, I would appeal to you to use your good offices to urge SPLM/SPLA to respect the ceasefire and to embark on direct negotiations with the Government of the Sudan to reach a final settlement on Southern Kordofan.

(*Signed*) Daffa Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2011/554

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 September 2011

Original: English

Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1886 (2009) and 1941 (2010), in which the Council requested me to submit a report on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) every six months. The report covers the period from 1 March to 31 August 2011.

II. Major developments

2. During the reporting period, Sierra Leone celebrated its fiftieth anniversary of independence with a sense of national pride and a growing determination to make further progress in addressing the socio-economic challenges facing the country and in consolidating peace and stability.

3. The main political parties intensified their preparations for the 2012 presidential, parliamentary and local council elections. The major opposition party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), successfully resolved a court case that had been filed against the party. It then held a national conference at which it elected its presidential candidate for the 2012 elections. President Koroma was nominated as the candidate of the ruling All Peoples Congress (APC) at its conference at Makeni in 2009. Also, planning for the 2012 elections by the National Electoral Commission reached an advanced stage, and voter registration is scheduled for the first quarter of 2012. Sierra Leone is now poised for the 2012 elections.

4. If the current financial projections are achieved, the expansion of Sierra Leone's mining sector would, in the near future, significantly increase the country's revenues, which, in turn could help the Government bring about important social and economic changes. However, in order to sustain such encouraging prospects, the establishment of strong accountability and transparency mechanisms would be required. Other outstanding challenges facing the country include youth unemployment and the adverse impact of urbanization, poverty, as well as the high cost of living.

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A. Political developments

5. The overall political situation remained calm, but the relationship between the ruling APC and the opposition SLPP continued to be characterized by deep mutual mistrust.

6. Sierra Leone celebrated its fiftieth anniversary of independence on 29 April 2011. In a speech to mark the occasion, President Koroma recalled the violent conflict of the 1990s and affirmed that the country was celebrating a new Sierra Leone that will sustain peace, democracy and development. He emphasized the need for Sierra Leoneans to resolve their political differences through peaceful, civil and constitutional means. The President also acknowledged efforts made by international partners such as the United Kingdom, Nigeria and the United Nations to help end the country's civil war. As part of the anniversary celebration, UNIPSIL, with financial assistance from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund and in collaboration with local groups, arranged for a "peace torch" to be carried throughout the country, which provided an opportunity for various stakeholders to reaffirm their commitment to peace and unity in Sierra Leone.

7. From 29 to 31 July 2011, SLPP held a national conference in Freetown and elected retired Brigadier Maada Bio, a former Head of State, as the party's presidential candidate for the 2012 elections. There were 19 candidates, including three women. Members of the SLPP national executive committee were also elected at the conference, which was preceded by intra-party dissension and violence. Furthermore, one of the presidential candidates had filed a complaint with the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone on the grounds that the mandate of the party's delegates to the national conference had expired. That led to the granting of an injunction by the Supreme Court restraining the party from holding the national conference earlier.

8. Also, during this period, my Executive Representative consulted with senior members of SLPP and offered his good offices to help concerned officials iron out their differences and organize a successful conference. The party conducted intra-party elections for its district and constituency positions and, on 19 July, the Supreme Court lifted the injunction, paving the way for the national conference.

9. Overall, the conference was well conducted and the voting was credible, according to local and international observers. The meetings convened by the candidates throughout the country to actively canvass the support of delegates was a positive step for Sierra Leone's democracy. The police provided security for the conference and, in a goodwill gesture, the ruling APC ordered that its offices, which were in the vicinity of the conference, be closed and its members were instructed not to appear in party colours. However, at a press conference held on 5 August, the APC Secretary-General, Victor Foh, raised questions about the role of Mr. Bio (the SLPP presidential candidate) in the military regime of the National Provisional Ruling Council, which overthrew an APC Government in March 1992. Mr. Foh stated that the country had a responsibility to collectively reject Mr. Bio's candidacy at the 2012 elections.

10. There were also continued dissensions within the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), the third party represented in Parliament. PMDC has had ministerial representation in the Cabinet since 2007, but on 7 April it announced that it was leaving the coalition with the ruling party, a position that was publicly

challenged by three PMDC ministers serving in the Koroma administration. Two of them subsequently announced their resignation from the party.

11. A crucial by-election held during the reporting period was the one in Kailahun District, in the eastern region, on 28 May. The vacancy arose from the appointment of the incumbent parliamentarian, from SLPP, to a ministerial position in the APC Government, and his subsequent resignation from the party. The district is part of the political stronghold of SLPP. The political campaign was tense, with clashes between supporters of SLPP and APC, as well as of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). To prevent further deterioration, UNIPSIL facilitated a visit to the district by representatives of the international community in Freetown. They met with the candidates and other stakeholders to impress on them the need to exercise restraint. UNIPSIL also helped mobilize, in collaboration with the Political Parties Registration Commission, the All Political Parties Youth Association to lead efforts aimed at tackling political violence. This paved the way for the conduct of a peaceful election, which was won by the SLPP candidate.

Implementation of the joint communiqué of 2 April

12. Though the Government is yet to release the White Paper on the investigation into the political disturbances in March 2009, UNIPSIL continued its efforts to help implement the joint communiqué of 2 April. UNIPSIL, with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund, was instrumental in facilitating the establishment of the All Political Parties Women's Association, launched by President Koroma in Bo on 12 June. The President used the opportunity to reiterate his pledge to adopt a 30 per cent quota for women in the country's governance and elective institutions. The All Political Parties Women's Association, whose convention elected a national executive committee, has continued its media outreach and held coordination meetings with the female parliamentary caucus, female councillors and civil society organizations on ways of increasing the political participation of women.

13. The All Political Parties Youth Association is another initiative supported by UNIPSIL, with financial support from the Peacebuilding Fund. It comprises SLPP, APC, PMDC and NDA, and has become fully operational after establishing chapters in all of the country's 112 constituencies. It has also established an office in Freetown. To underscore the need for accountability, a financial manual was developed. Both Associations will serve as vital forums for promoting conflict resolution, political tolerance and non-violence in the 2012 elections.

14. During the reporting period, an outreach programme to spread the messages of political tolerance and national cohesion contained in the joint communiqué through films and drama sketches was prepared. The implementation of these programmes will commence shortly and target communities in chiefdoms experiencing political tensions. In addition, the films will be broadcast on national television and radio across the country. These activities to implement the joint communiqué were undertaken by UNIPSIL with financial assistance provided by the Peacebuilding Fund.

Preparations for the 2012 elections

15. Preparations are under way for the 2012 elections, tentatively scheduled for the last quarter of 2012. In order to ensure proper coordination and coherence in planning for the elections, two election steering committee meetings were held,

which were co-chaired by the Minister for Finance and Economic Development and my Executive Representative. They were attended by international development partners and key national stakeholders. The National Electoral Commission gave an overview of vital material assistance thus far provided by the Government, which will share the funding for the elections with international partners. The Commission, with assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), also began a review of its 2010-2014 strategic plan, with a focus on the 2012 election budget. Discussions are under way on the concerns raised by the representative of the police during the Steering Committee meetings that special attention should be paid to enhancing police mobility.

16. Special attention is also being given to initiating an electoral legal reform process that will ensure, among others, that the legal controversy which arose in the 2007 presidential elections regarding the authority of the National Electoral Commission to nullify votes, is addressed. Accordingly, the Commission, with support from the UNDP-managed electoral basket fund and UNIPSIL, organized an electoral legal reform workshop from 29 to 31 March 2011, which was attended by the political parties and civil society. The workshop submitted its recommendations to a technical committee, comprising the Law Reform Commission and the Law Officers Department, UNIPSIL and representatives of civil society. The committee has reviewed the conclusions of the workshop and made recommendations on several issues such as the determination of dates for the conduct of public elections, the rules for the election of a president, and forfeiture of parliamentary seats.

17. The legal reform process involving the Political Parties Registration Commission has started, and it will examine issues relating to the competencies of the Commission, including sanctions for breaches of the code of conduct of political parties and the possibility of granting quasi-judicial authority to the Commission to deal with such infractions.

18. Considerable progress has also been made in developing a biometric voter registration system for the 2012 elections. UNDP provided an international expert who worked closely with the Commission on the modalities for the system. In accordance with the established procurement requirements, a joint NEC/UNDP technical evaluation panel identified, in early June, two successful bidders, who have since carried out field testing in Sierra Leone of various components of their biometric equipment. To ensure transparency, a number of observers from political parties, civil society and the Political Parties Registration Commission were invited to monitor the tests. The results of the tests were positive as both systems were able to process required data.

19. The National Electoral Commission held a press conference in June to raise awareness of the biometric system. It also plans to carry out extensive voter sensitization and to brief the political parties on the system. Voter registration is scheduled to take place in the first quarter of 2012.

Contribution of non-State actors

20. During the reporting period, UNIPSIL continued to work with the Inter-Religious Council, paramount chiefs, youth and women groups, artists, community-based organizations, the media and academic institutions to mobilize key non-State actors to play a constructive role in the 2012 elections. The project also aims at building the capacities of these institutions to carry out, in the longer

term, conflict prevention and mediation tasks, especially when the political presence of the United Nations in Sierra Leone draws down. To that end, UNIPSIL, in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development, organized a conference of paramount chiefs in Bo City from 19 to 22 April. The conference resulted in the adoption of the Bo Communiqué of 22 April 2011, which, among other things, calls on paramount chiefs to remain neutral in politics. UNIPSIL has begun an outreach programme on the contents of the communiqué. UNIPSIL is also concluding, in consultation with the Political Parties Registration Commission, arrangements for capacity-building and limited infrastructural support to some political parties in the country.

21. An agreement was signed between UNIPSIL and the Independent Radio Network (IRN) to coordinate the dissemination of messages of peace and non-violence through IRN's network of 24 community radio stations in the country. UNIPSIL provided interim support to Cotton Tree News to improve its linkage with IRN. To facilitate further discussions on a code of conduct for the media and election-related issues, UNIPSIL sponsored a conference of the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists in Kenema. In consultation with several youth groups, and the Sierra Leone Union on Disability Issues, UNIPSIL is finalizing a sensitization programme targeting youths and marginalized groups in the country that will convey messages of non-violence using a peer-to-peer approach and through sports. A series of seminars to promote national unity and cohesion are also being planned in collaboration with institutions of higher learning. All these activities are funded by the Peacebuilding Fund.

B. Security developments

22. The overall security situation remained calm during the period under review. However, the Sierra Leone Police expressed concern over the proliferation of small arms, particularly locally manufactured shot guns. They stressed the need for the public to help prevent and curb their use. The problem appeared to be complicated by porous borders that allowed the flow of illegal weapons. In preparation for the 2012 elections, the National Security Council Coordinating Group, including the Police, the Armed Forces and other security sector agencies, has approved an election security strategy amounting to $11.7 million and covering several important areas, including training, logistics, and the establishment of command and control apparatus.

C. Economic and social developments

23. With Sierra Leone's real gross domestic product (GDP) increasing by approximately 5 per cent in 2010, the economy is emerging from the effects of the global economic downturn, which had reduced real GDP growth to 3.2 per cent in 2009. Economic recovery in 2010 was led by growth in manufacturing, mining, construction and agriculture sectors, and supported during the second half by a large increase in public spending. The increased public spending was on account of several priority infrastructure projects.

24. However, as a result of factors such as the depreciation of the local currency in 2010 and an increase in Government spending, the inflation averaged nearly 18 per

cent through 2010. The fiscal expansion also led to an increase in interest rates in the economy. During the first half of 2011, the Government put in place strong corrective measures to stabilize the fiscal situation, which have proven effective so far.

25. In May, the Government increased fuel pump prices by nearly 30 per cent because of rising global prices and the removal of fuel subsidies, but subsequently lowered them by about 10 per cent when global prices fell, and when threatened by protests by youth groups. Such increases could potentially inflict hardships on the poor, and the Government is looking at stepping up safety nets.

26. Regarding the mining sector, on 20 July, the Government launched a workplan for the Sierra Leone Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In addition to the workplan, a minerals negotiating team was established to review all mining contracts. Earlier, on 21 April, the World Bank approved a grant of $4 million for building local capacity to prepare and negotiate mining agreements and to ensure regulatory compliance.

27. The likely future increases in domestic revenue from the mining sector and the hydrocarbon sector will create significant opportunities, including enabling the Government to overcome the huge infrastructure deficit and to increase spending on human development priorities. At the same time, there are risks, and these revenues need to be carefully managed in order to avoid any adverse impact on traditional sectors such as agriculture, or to prevent a boom and bust cycle. Careful consideration would need to be given to these issues during the preparation and the implementation of the Agenda for Change 2 strategy.

28. The Free Health Care Initiative continued to provide vital life-saving medical care and drugs to children under the age of 5, as well as pregnant and lactating women. With key support from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Kingdom Department for International Development and other partners, the Government ensured access to health care at every level for the target group. Efforts to strengthen drug distribution systems and prevent leakages started in the reporting period. The preparation of five Key Pillar Documents, including the joint programme review for the national strategic plan on HIV/AIDS, were completed in the reporting period. These documents will guide national response to HIV/AIDS into the coming decade. Parliament also enacted the National AIDS Commission Act, which establishes the Commission and provides for the protection of people living with HIV/AIDS, including widows. It will soon be signed into law by President Koroma.

III. Main risks to peace consolidation

A. Youth

29. Unacceptably high levels of youth unemployment persist and remain a threat to peace consolidation. Current initiatives to address the problem include a $10 million cash-for-work scheme, as well as a $6 million employment proposal scheme, both of which are funded by the World Bank. The Bank further provides institutional support valued at $1 million. UNDP, the International Labour

Organization and GTZ: Partner for the Future Worldwide are also engaged in youth employment and empowerment schemes.

30. Efforts to address youth unemployment were bolstered with the approval of Parliament, on 7 June 2011, of the appointment of a commissioner to head the National Youth Commission and thus strengthen coordination in this area. Counterpart ministries have signalled an intention to collaborate with the Commission. After the appointment of the commissioner, a strategic planning meeting of key stakeholders was held on 10 and 11 June 2011. UNDP provided technical support for the establishment of the Youth Commission and refurbished its premises. It also procured office equipment for the Commission.

B. Corruption

31. Tackling corruption remains a challenge for the Government. During the reporting period, the Anti-Corruption Commission strengthened its capacity to investigate and prosecute cases in line with its strategic plan for 2011 to 2013. It also continued decentralizing its services and engaging Government departments and the public through outreach programmes aimed at inculcating anti-corruption messages in the public. On 5 May, the Commission signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of the United Kingdom that will provide a framework for dialogue and capacity-building.

32. On 13 May, the Commission presented its annual report, as well as cheques for the sums of 611 million leones ($143,000) and $9,450 to President Koroma, who reaffirmed his support for the work of the Commission. Regarding prosecutions by the Commission, the Director-General of the National Revenue Authority was acquitted of several corruption charges, but the Commission has appealed the decision. However, it secured the conviction of other public officials, including some from the Attitudinal and Behavioral Change Secretariat, which has responsibility for promoting moral renewal in the country. The Commission faces a number of constraints, including a lack of personnel and inadequate office space in Freetown.

C. Illicit drug trafficking and organized crime

33. The Sierra Leone Transnational Organized Crime Unit continued its work within the framework of the West Africa Coast Initiative. The Unit has recorded 28 cases of drug interceptions so far in 2011.

34. However, the cultivation of *cannabis sativa* for export to neighbouring countries remains a major problem. UNIPSIL continued discussions with the police and other stakeholders on steps required to eradicate large *cannabis sativa* farms, with funds provided by Irish Aid. Discussions also focused on drawing on the Smallholder Commercial Scheme, which encourages small scale farming, as a means of providing alternative livelihoods to those engaged in the cultivation of *cannabis sativa*. Finally, the Transnational Organized Crime Unit is in the process of developing other strategies, including asset confiscation procedures.

35. During the reporting period, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) mobilized additional funding to provide appropriate premises for the

Transnational Organized Crime Unit, support the development of the forensic capacity of the Sierra Leone Police, and the strengthening of the capacity of the Joint Maritime Wing in reducing illegal activities in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone. Intelligence and law enforcement operations were conducted with a view to strengthen border management, especially at the Lungi International Airport. To counter money-laundering, UNODC provided further mentoring and equipment to the Transnational Organized Crime Unit, the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Anti-Corruption Commission.

IV. Support to democratic institutions

A. National Electoral Commission

36. In addition to preparations for the 2012 elections, the National Electoral Commission continued to conduct credible parliamentary by-elections, local council elections and chieftaincy elections. Significant technical support amounting to about $25 million was earmarked for the Commission in the UNDP-managed basket fund in areas such as information technology support and strengthening of district and regional offices. Current planning for the 2012 elections envisages a reduced level of international expertise to the Commission in contrast to the 2007 elections, which is testimony to past successful efforts in building the capacity of the Commission.

37. The interaction between SLPP and the National Electoral Commission remained difficult, with influential members of the party criticizing the leadership of the Electoral Commission and expressing reservations about an electoral education programme run by the Commission aimed at developing a pool of future electoral staff. In the period under review, the Supreme Court granted SLPP leave to argue before the Court the case filed against the Commission challenging its nullification of votes in 477 polling stations during the 2007 presidential elections. The case is still pending. Nonetheless, the Electoral Commission continues to engage with the political parties through its Political Parties Liaison Committee and discussions are under way between UNIPSIL, the Political Parties Registration Commission and the National Electoral Commission on how to improve the work of the Liaison Committee and in particular the cooperation between the political parties and the Commission.

B. Political Parties Registration Commission

38. The newly appointed Chair of the Political Parties Registration Commission, Justice Ademusu, was sworn in on 14 April. The post had been vacant for some time, and his appointment is expected to energize the work of the Commission in promoting mediation between the political parties as the 2012 elections approach. The Commission will also lead, with the support of UNIPSIL, efforts at promoting inter-party dialogue and the advancement of the joint communiqué of 2 April. Assistance to the Commission, as envisaged in the electoral basket fund, is being finalized. With additional support from the United States Agency for International Development, the mediation and conflict resolution capacity of the Political Parties Registration Commission was strengthened with training for members of its district

code of conduct monitoring committees. Regular sittings of the Committees have commenced.

C. Independent Media Commission

39. In the reporting period, the High Court of Sierra Leone upheld a decision of the Independent Media Commission, denying a licence to the Freetown City Council to operate a radio station. The Council is managed by the ruling APC party. The High Court also upheld a ruling of the Commission closing down the SLPP radio station. The Commission noted at the time that broadcasts on political party radio stations had contributed to incidents of political intolerance and violence. The Commission will receive assistance under the electoral basket fund to improve its media regulatory mechanisms in the run-up to the 2012 elections.

D. Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation

40. In a bid to demonstrate that the corporation can be impartial and afford access to all political parties, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation covered the recently concluded SLPP national conference and provided airtime to the 19 SLPP presidential candidates. UNIPSIL, with financial assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund, continued to assist the corporation with salary support for 160 staff, as well as technical advice in the programme production. However, a review of the corporation's financial and operational capabilities may be necessary to enable it to function effectively as an independent national broadcaster. Such review should take into account its staffing and remuneration levels vis-à-vis available resources.

E. Parliament

41. Parliament, with the support of UNDP, began recruiting staff for eight administrative departments called for in the Parliamentary Service Act. Some staff will assume responsibility for preparing the parliamentary *Hansard* and dissemination of parliamentary legislation to the public.

F. Decentralization and devolution

42. The number of functions devolved in the decentralization and devolution process remained at 46, from a total of 80. Progress in the devolution process was hampered by inertia of the central government, coupled with limited capacity in key areas in some local councils and poor conditions of service.

V. Human rights

National Human Rights Commission

43. During the reporting period, the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone exercised its quasi-judicial mandate in its first public hearing in a matter involving 235 former Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) soldiers who had been

compulsorily retired because of their categorizations by RSLAF as "chronically ill" and "mentally imbalanced". In a landmark decision, rendered on 27 June 2011, the Commission held that the former soldiers had suffered discrimination and inhumane treatment and had their right to privacy violated. The Government has not appealed the decision.

44. In another significant development, the independence of the Commission was recognized with an "A" status accreditation in June 2011 by the International Coordination Committee of the National Human Rights Institutions.

45. On 10 March 2011, the Parliament unanimously passed the Persons with Disabilities Act, which provides for the establishment of a national commission for persons with disabilities. This was a major step towards addressing the challenge of discrimination.

46. Several capacity-building programmes were implemented in the period under review by UNIPSIL, such as technical support to the Human Rights Commission in establishing the Monitoring and Research Directorate and training in human rights monitoring for its personnel.

VI. Gender issues

47. During the reporting period, UNIPSIL and the United Nations country team adopted, in line with the Joint Vision strategy, a four-pronged approach in addressing gender matters that consisted of (a) the promotion of access to health care for women and girls; (b) access to political participation and decision-making; (c) access to justice for women and girls; and (d) efforts to address gender-based violence. The United Nations Global Open Day for Women and Peace is tentatively scheduled for 27 and 28 September, and planning is in progress.

48. On the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and the Sierra Leone national action plan, UNIPSIL and members of the M30 Taskforce, a coalition of advocacy groups, continued the preparation of a draft bill on a 30 per cent quota for women in elective positions in the country. It will be presented to Parliament in September 2011 and as an effort at increasing the participation of women. During a ceremony held on 29 March 2011 to commemorate International Women's Day and in furtherance of the national action plan, President Koroma delivered a speech in which he stated that a sexual offences bill, which will include maximum and mandatory punishment for rape, will be fast tracked in Parliament. The President pledged his support for the 30 per cent quota legislation for women and declared that 8 March, International Women's Day, will be a national holiday. Similarly, the Sierra Leone Chieftaincy Act will be reviewed to allow women to become paramount chiefs in all parts of the country. Since then, the Cabinet has approved the sexual offences bill, which will be submitted to Parliament in September 2011.

49. Other steps taken in connection with the implementation of the national action plan and in tackling sexual and gender-based violence were the establishment of information desks in Freetown courts that provide advice on laws affecting women and girls. Plans to expand the scheme to other cities are under consideration. Dedicated courts, which sit on Saturdays, have been established in Freetown to handle sexual and gender-based violence matters, and this has resulted in a

reduction of the backlog of sexual and gender-based violence cases. Also to facilitate the prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence cases, UNIPSIL worked closely with civil society organizations and the police to provide ad hoc witness protection. The absence of witnesses, or at times their reluctance to testify because of possible retribution, had impeded the prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence cases. The availability of free medical examinations for sexual and gender-based violence victims as a result of interventions by UNIPSIL and local stakeholders has also helped the prosecution of sexual and gender-based violence cases because some victims could not afford the fees charged for such examinations.

50. With assistance from UNIPSIL, UN-Women and the United Nations Population Fund, three district *Sowies* (female traditional leaders) associations were established in May and July with the goal of reaching a consensus with the *Sowies* that female genital mutilation will not be practised on girls under the age of 18. UNIPSIL has endeavoured to work closely with the *Sowies* in changing attitudes towards female genital mutilation.

51. With regard to gender mainstreaming in the security sector, the Sierra Leone Police continued to support several talented women through their ranks in an accelerated promotion programme. It also developed more family-friendly human resource policies, and the number of women being recruited continues to rise and is currently just over 10 per cent.

VII. Sustaining peacebuilding

52. During the reporting period, the United Nations country team secured $9,282,000 from the United Nations "Delivering As One" fund (compared to $9,700,000 from the "Delivering as One" fund in 2010), funding which is channelled through the Sierra Leone Multi-Donor Trust Fund established under the Joint Vision strategy. Other deposits into the Fund in 2011 were from the Australian Agency for International Development, the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs. Funding for the Joint Vision strategy through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund has been lower than hoped since its inception, and, as a result, the Peacebuilding Fund has been an important source of funding for the United Nations in Sierra Leone since 2007. The Peacebuilding Fund in Sierra Leone continues to support projects on non-State actors and war victims, as well as gender-related elements of the Joint Vision strategy, such as the strengthening of a referral system for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and the improvement of a legal environment that recognizes the rights of women and girls.

53. From 24 to 27 May 2011, the Chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, Ambassador John McNee, led a delegation of several Member States to Sierra Leone. The delegation met with a range of national actors and international partners, including President Koroma and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance, representatives of political parties and of Sierra Leonean's democratic institutions, as well as civil society and members of the diplomatic community in Freetown. The visit focused on the Peacebuilding Commission priority areas of good governance, combating drug trafficking and illegal narcotics, and youth unemployment. The delegation had an opportunity to discuss at length the 2012

elections with all relevant actors. The Peacebuilding Commission delegation commended the remarkable progress made by Sierra Leone in consolidating its democratic institutions and reiterated the support of the Commission for the final phase of its peacebuilding process. Importantly, the delegation appealed to all parties to compete fairly in the 2012 elections, which would be based on clear rules to be agreed and accepted by all parties, well ahead of the election date.

VIII. Special Court for Sierra Leone

54. The closing arguments in the last trial before the Special Court of former Liberian President Charles Taylor concluded on 11 March 2011. A verdict is expected in September 2011.

55. On 24 May 2011, Trial Chamber II issued orders in two separate cases charging five persons with contempt of the Special Court. The cases involved the interference with witnesses in the trials concerning former members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Charles Taylor. One person pleaded guilty in the AFRC case and the case in the matter regarding the Charles Taylor trial was adjourned to later this year.

56. Both cases highlight the need for witness protection as part of the court's residual responsibilities. Consequently, discussions on establishing a national witness protection programme, which would serve Special Court witnesses and witnesses within the national system, have commenced with the Government.

IX. Regional cooperation

57. Sierra Leone continued to strengthen relations with its neighbours and other countries in the subregion. On 21 June, President Koroma hosted a one-day mini-summit of a five-nation ad hoc committee of Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to review appointments to ECOWAS statutory bodies, including the ECOWAS Court of Justice and other organs of the Commission. The meeting was attended by the Presidents of Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Togo, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali.

58. President Koroma attended, on 17 July, an extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of the Mano River Union in Monrovia. The summit expressed satisfaction at the relative peace and stability in the Mano River Basin, as well as positive developments in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea. In a final communiqué adopted at the end of the summit, participants pledged to enhance their cooperation towards joint security and the development of infrastructure among Mano River Union member States.

X. Observations and recommendations

59. I applaud Sierra Leone for the efforts on peace consolidation and socio-economic progress, despite significant challenges. That progress is a testimony to the untiring efforts of its Government and of other actors whose contribution to promoting national cohesion, political tolerance and non-violence would remain critical before, during and after the 2012 elections.

60. I am encouraged by the upcoming commencement of the voter registration process in the first quarter of 2012. I urge all political parties and their supporters to come together in the national interest in order to create a peaceful and conducive environment for an electoral process that meets acceptable democratic standards. It is also essential that Sierra Leone maintains strong and confident political parties, which, ultimately, are agents of change. I therefore call on Sierra Leone's political party leaders to promote a culture of constructive dialogue aimed at resolving peacefully inter-party and intra-party differences.

61. I urge the media to play a more constructive role in the electoral process and to refrain from any inflammatory publications that can raise tensions or incite violence. I also call on the media to abide by the agreed revised Media Code of Conduct in order to help create and maintain a peaceful environment. The Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation has proved to be a useful tool in the dissemination of information and advancing national cohesion. It is essential that every effort be made to strengthen the Corporation's operational capabilities to allow it to continue to play its role as an independent national broadcaster.

62. I encourage strengthened collaboration between the extractive sector and national and international partners. Sierra Leone's extractive industries are crucial in promoting the country's economic prosperity through the provision of revenues to the Government, which in turn could generate employment opportunities. Closely related is the need for greater attention to social issues, and, in particular, minimizing poverty, inflationary pressures, youth unemployment and other problems confronting a majority of Sierra Leoneans. The establishment of strong accountability and transparency mechanisms is also required to ensure the sustainability of prospects for economic growth.

63. I welcome the proposal made by President Koroma to convene, at the earliest opportunity, a national conference of all stakeholders, to address political and other grievances, and reach agreement on the modalities for the holding of peaceful elections and the strengthening of efforts aimed at achieving national consensus and cohesion on the key challenges facing the country. My Executive Representative stands ready to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in organizing such an important conference.

64. I commend the continuing efforts of President Koroma and his Government to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), particularly through the proposed legislation on a 30 per cent quota for women in elective positions. It is crucial that planning for the 2012 elections also take into account the necessary gender dimensions, and I urge all stakeholders to fully contribute to this process.

65. I also wish to express my appreciation for the continuing support of the Peacebuilding Commission to Sierra Leone, as well as the strong commitment of the outgoing Chair of the Sierra Leone configuration, Ambassador John McNee, former Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations. His engagement with national and international stakeholders has served the cause of peacebuilding in Sierra Leone and greatly supported the efforts of UNIPSIL. Over the coming months, the Peacebuilding Commission should continue to support core peacebuilding objectives in Sierra Leone, intensify its engagement in support of the electoral process in the country and provide timely advice to the Security Council for its consideration.

66. Taking into account planning for the 2012 elections, I recommend that the mandate of UNIPSIL, as expressed in Security Council resolution 1940 (2010) and previous relevant resolutions, be renewed for a further year. The renewal will also enable UNIPSIL to continue its peace consolidation and national reconciliation efforts, its support for good governance reforms, as well as tackling anti-corruption, drug trafficking and organized crime, addressing youth unemployment and building support for international donor assistance.

67. Finally, I thank President Koroma and the Government of Sierra Leone for their continued support to UNIPSIL in the performance of its mandate. I would like to express my appreciation to Sierra Leone's international development partners and to the African Development Bank and the World Bank for their contributions to the peace consolidation process in Sierra Leone. I also thank the staff of UNIPSIL and the United Nations system in Sierra Leone for their unstinting efforts in executing the mandate of UNIPSIL under the leadership of my Executive Representative, Michael von der Schulenburg.

United Nations S/2011/555

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 September 2011

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

At its 6335th meeting, held on 9 June 2010 in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation", the Security Council adopted resolution 1929 (2010).

In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Security Council requested the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to communicate to the Security Council all his reports on the application of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Accordingly, the President herewith circulates the report of the Director General dated 2 September 2011 (see annex).

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Annex

Letter dated 2 September 2011 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the President of the Security Council

I enclose herewith the report requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1929 (2010), which I have submitted today to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and the enclosed report to the attention of all members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

Enclosure*

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement[1] and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran).

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions[2] are binding on Iran.[3] The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.[4]

3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations,[5] the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council's responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,[6] and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter.

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* Circulated to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency under the symbol GOV/2011/54.

[1] The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

[2] The Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); and GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

[3] In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran's obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras. 1-6).

[4] The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

[5] The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A.

[6] The Charter of the United Nations, Article 25.

4. In meetings held in Vienna on 21 June 2011 and on 12 July 2011, the Director General discussed issues related to the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and other relevant obligations with H.E. Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Vice President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and H.E. Dr Ali Akbar Salehi, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, respectively.

5. In response to an invitation from Iran, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited Iran from 14 to 19 August 2011. During his visit, the Deputy Director General visited the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordow, the IR-40 Reactor and Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak, and the conversion and fuel fabrication facilities at Esfahan. Iran also provided access to an installation where research and development (R&D) on advanced centrifuges was taking place. During his visit, the Deputy Director General also held meetings with Dr Abbasi.

6. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/29, 24 May 2011), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

B. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

7. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities[7] and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).[8] Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non diversion of declared nuclear material at these facilities and LOFs.

C. Enrichment Related Activities

8. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which are nevertheless under Agency safeguards.

C.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant

9. **Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)**: There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B.

[7] Since the previous report, the Agency has verified and confirmed the decommissioned status of the Fuel Fabrication Laboratory at Esfahan.

[8] All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

10. On 28 August 2011, 53 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A, 35 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF_6.[9] Whereas initially each installed cascade comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran has subsequently modified 12 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 28 August 2011, installation work in the remaining five units was ongoing, but no centrifuges had been installed, and there had been no installation work in Production Hall B.

11. Iran has estimated that, between 18 October 2010 and 13 August 2011, it produced 1408 kg of low enriched UF_6, which would result in a total production of 4543 kg of low enriched UF_6 since February 2007.[10] The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.[11] The consequences for safeguards of the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area, referred to in the previous report,[12] will be evaluated by the Agency upon completion of the next Physical Inventory Verification (PIV), currently envisaged for October 2011.

12. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007[13] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ).

13. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)**: PFEP is an R&D facility and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in October 2003. It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 and an area designated for R&D.

14. In the production area, Iran first began feeding low enriched UF_6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010, for the stated purpose of producing UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).[14,15] Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF_6 into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges.[16]

15. Since the last report, Iran has continued to work on improving its measurement system, especially through the implementation of an improved weighing system and

[9] The 53 installed cascades contained approximately 8000 centrifuges; the 35 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UF_6 on that date contained 5860 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF_6 may have been working.

[10] The Agency previously verified that, as of 17 October 2010, a total of 3135 kg of low enriched UF_6 had been produced since the start of operations in February 2007 (GOV/2011/29, para. 9).

[11] In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance.

[12] GOV/2011/29, para. 10.

[13] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 1 February 2011.

[14] GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

[15] TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

[16] GOV/2010/28, para. 9.

better sampling procedures, which is expected to result in a more accurate determination of the level of U-235 enrichment.[17]

16. Iran has estimated that, between 19 September 2010 and 20 August 2011, a total of 320.5 kg of UF_6 enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades and that approximately 45.7 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 was produced. This would result in a total of approximately 70.8 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 having been produced since the process began in February 2010.

17. In the R&D area, between 22 May 2011 and 20 August 2011, a total of approximately 170.1 kg of natural UF_6 was fed into centrifuges, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are recombined at the end of the process.

18. As of 28 August 2011, Iran had installed 136 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade 5.[18] As the Agency had been informed by Iran in a letter dated 22 June 2011, Iran started feeding 54 of the IR-2m centrifuges with natural UF_6. Since the last report, Iran has installed 27 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, none of which, as of 28 August 2011, had been fed with natural UF_6.

19. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP[19] and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the DIQ.

C.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant

20. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. In its DIQ of 10 October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to contain 16 cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges.[20]

21. In September 2010, Iran provided the Agency with a revised DIQ in which it stated that the purpose of FFEP was to include R&D as well as the production of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.

22. On 8 June 2011, it was reported that Iran had decided to "transfer the 20-per cent-uranium enrichment … to the Fordow plant" and would "triple its (production) capacity", after which Iran would stop the "20% fuel production" at Natanz.[21] On 9 June 2011, the Agency received a letter from Iran informing the Agency of Iran's decision to produce UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at FFEP.

23. On 25 June 2011, Iran provided the Agency with another revised DIQ in which the stated purpose of FFEP, as well as R&D, was the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, and that initially this production would take place within two sets of two interconnected cascades. Each of these cascades will consist of 174 centrifuges.

[17] GOV/2011/29, para. 14.

[18] Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area (GOV/2011/7, para. 17).

[19] Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 1 January 2011.

[20] GOV/2009/74, para. 9.

[21] Dr. Fereydoun Abbasi, 'Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium', Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011.

24. In a letter dated 27 July 2011, Iran provided answers to a number of technical questions from the Agency relating to this revised DIQ, and provided another revised DIQ.

25. On 7 August 2011, the Agency and Iran agreed on a safeguards approach for FEEP. As of 20 August 2011, Iran had installed one of the cascades designated in the DIQ for the production of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235.

26. The Agency continues to verify that FEEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided by Iran. Since the last report, Iran has provided some clarification regarding the initial timing of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FEEP at an existing defence establishment. Additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility.

27. The results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at FEEP up to 29 December 2010 did not indicate the presence of enriched uranium.[22]

C.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

28. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided, and the construction of one of which was to have begun by the end of the last Iranian year (20 March 2011) or the start of this Iranian year.[23,24] To date, the Agency has no information as to whether that construction has started. Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology.[25] As a result of Iran's lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and to report fully on these matters.

29. On 18 August 2011, in response to Agency requests, Iran provided the Agency access to an installation where R&D on advanced centrifuges was taking place. During the Agency's visit, Iran provided extensive information on its current and future R&D work on advanced centrifuges.

D. Reprocessing Activities

30. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.[26] In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it "does not have reprocessing activities". In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope

[22] The results did show a small number of particles of depleted uranium (GOV/2010/10, para. 17).

[23] 'Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites', Fars News Agency, 16 August 2010.

[24] GOV/2010/46, para. 33.

[25] Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255.

[26] S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

Production (MIX) Facility.[27] On 17 August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV and a design information verification (DIV) at TRR, and a DIV at the MIX Facility. It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access, that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran.

E. Heavy Water Related Projects

31. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, the IR-40 Reactor, which is subject to Agency safeguards.[28]

32. On 9 August 2011, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing, the moderator heat exchangers had been installed and the coolant heat exchangers had been delivered to the site. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence by the end of 2013.

33. On 17 August 2011, during its first visit to the HWPP since 2005, the Agency observed that the HWPP was operating. During the visit, Iran told the Agency that it had produced approximately 60 tons of heavy water at HWPP. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples.[29]

F. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

34. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan, as described below, that are in contravention of those obligations, notwithstanding that both facilities are under Agency safeguards.

35. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the PIV carried out at UCF in March 2011 (GOV/2011/29, para. 30), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at UCF as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with conversion plants of similar throughput.

36. In a letter dated 15 June 2011, Iran provided the Agency with an updated schedule for the operation of UCF. According to the schedule, the production of natural UO_2 would commence on 23 July 2011 and the tests for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 on 23 August 2011. In a letter dated 20 July 2011, Iran informed the Agency that on 23 October 2011 it would restart the production of natural UF_6, involving the use of uranium ore concentrate (UOC)

[27] The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.

[28] S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para. 2.

[29] GOV/2010/10, paras. 20 and 21.

produced at the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant. In a letter dated 24 August 2011, Iran informed the Agency that tests for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8 would start on 6 September 2011. Iran has indicated that the initial tests of this conversion line will not involve the use of nuclear material.

37. In a letter dated 28 July 2011, Iran informed the Agency that it would start R&D activities at UCF for the conversion of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO_2.

38. On 8 August 2011, Iran and the Agency agreed to an updated safeguards approach for UCF that takes into account the production of natural UO_2, natural UF_6, and 20% U-235 as U3O8.

39. On 27 August 2011, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at UCF, during which Iran declared that it had fed into the process 652.2 kg of uranium in the form of UOC and produced about 96 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2, and further indicated that some of the product was fed back into the process. Iran has also started R&D activities using depleted uranium for the conversion of UF_6 into UO_2.

40. On 31 May 2011, in a DIQ for FMP, Iran informed the Agency that a fresh fuel rod of natural UO_2 manufactured at FMP would be shipped to TRR for irradiation and post-irradiation analysis.

41. On 10 August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV and a DIV at FMP and confirmed that Iran had not yet started to install equipment for the fabrication of fuel for TRR.[30]

42. In a letter dated 28 August 2011, Iran provided an updated DIQ for FMP, which the Agency is currently reviewing.

G. Possible Military Dimensions

43. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.[31] In particular, the Agency is increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency continues to receive new information. Examples of these activities were listed in the previous report.[32] The information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and comprehensive and has been acquired both from many Member States and through its own efforts. It is also broadly consistent and credible in terms of technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and organisations involved.[33]

44. The Board of Governors has called on Iran on a number of occasions to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues in order to exclude the

[30] GOV/2010/46, para. 26.

[31] GOV/2010/10, paras. 40-45; GOV/2009/55, paras. 18-25; GOV/2008/38, paras. 14-21; GOV/2008/15, paras. 14-25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras. 35-42.

[32] GOV/2011/29, para. 35.

[33] GOV/2010/10, para. 41.

existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.[34] In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran's obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.[35] In his letter to the Director General dated 26 May 2011, Dr Abbasi explained Iran's position on this issue. The Director General, in his letter of 3 June 2011 to Dr Abbasi, reminded Iran that it should fully implement all of its obligations in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. In the course of the meetings referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this report, the question of the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme was discussed.

H. Design Information

45. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement but which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code 3.1.[36] The Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of, inter alia, updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium enrichment facilities and the design of a reactor similar to TRR.[37]

46. As reported previously, Iran's response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in "due time" rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement.[38]

I. Additional Protocol

47. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will

[34] Most recently in GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009).

[35] S/RES/1929, paras. 2 and 3.

[36] In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General's reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to "comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1".

[37] GOV/2010/46, para. 32.

[38] See para. 28 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para. 37.

not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol.[39]

J. Other Matters

48. In a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to "transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU Control Fuel Element (CFE) and Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct a research project".

49. On 18 August 2011, the Agency undertook a visit to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, during which Iran explained that the reactor had been shut down for technical reasons and that it was planning to restart the reactor within the next few days.

K. Summary

50. While the Agency continues to conduct verification activities under Iran's Safeguards Agreement, Iran is not implementing a number of its obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related activities; and addressing the Agency's concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.

51. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[40]

52. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

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[39] Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

[40] The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49). Paragraph 51 reflects the past and current implementation by Iran of its Safeguards Agreement and other obligations.